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EDITOR’S NOTE

T

his issue presents four viewpoints on current issues involving judicial
elections, politics, and the effect of public opinion on the courts. In our
lead article, Shira Goodman and Lynn Marks of Pennsylvanians for
Modern Courts tell the story of Pennsylvania’s 2005 retention election for the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court. With very little warning, public opposition
developed to the retention of two justices: one was retained with 54% of the
vote and one was thrown out of office with only 49% voting to retain him.
The election was unusual because it did not relate to opinions issued by either
justice. Rather, the court and its judges got caught up in controversy over pay
raises for the judiciary, which passed only as a package with raises for other
governmental officials. Goodman and Marks
explore both the story and its implications.
Jan Baran, an election-law expert, reviews
the methods used today to select judges and
the ethics issues presented in a postRepublican Party of Minnesota v. White world.
His survey notes recent caselaw answering
some of the questions left open in the White
decision.
Bert Brandenburg, executive director of the
Justice at Stake campaign, presents the results
of their comprehensive national survey on the
public’s views about the judiciary. He discusses how judges and others
defending the court system can communicate effectively with the public about
these issues. The American Judges Association is a partner organization in
Justice at Stake. Brandenburg and others from Justice at Stake will hold a
workshop for attendees at the AJA midyear meeting in Newport, Rhode
Island, in April 2007.
Frank Cross, a political science professor, provides empirical data that support the proposition that judges rely on precedents, not their own personal
ideological views, in making most of their decisions. Contrary to the views of
some court critics, he found substantial disregard of precedent to be quite
rare.
In addition to these articles, John Barkai, Elizabeth Kent, and Pamela
Martin present the findings of a detailed study in the Hawaii courts on what
leads to case settlements, when in the process cases are most likely to settle,
and what factors lead to settlements. One of our student editors, William
Hurst IV, presents a review of two books on the rule of law.
In the next issue, we will have an exciting announcement about plans for
Court Review.—SL
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President’s Column
Michael Cicconetti

During the past 12 months the slogan of Morton Salt,
“When It Rains It Pours,” did not bring to mind images of the
“Morton Salt Girl” walking in the rain accidentally dropping
salt behind her. However, this slogan was a real and literal
statement of water disasters in various parts of this country.
Living in Northeastern Ohio, we are constantly promoting
this part of the state as an area virtually free of natural disasters.
Oh sure, we have our lake-effect snow, which we have learned
to treat as more of an inconvenience and annoyance than a danger. Hurricanes? Those are reserved for the coastal states.
Tornadoes? Hello, Kansas! Northeastern Ohio hasn’t experienced one in 35 years. Droughts? We may have an occasional
dry spell during the summer but we always have the Great
Lakes as a plentiful water source. Mudslides?
Never.
Forest fires?
Doesn’t happen.
Earthquakes? Minor blips on the Richter Scale.
Our so-called “Greatest Location in the
Nation” suddenly became a misnomer during the
last week of July. The rains in Lake County,
Ohio, began on Thursday morning and continued, nearly nonstop, for the next 17 hours. Some
areas within three miles of the Painesville
Municipal Court received up to 10 inches of rain.
The ditches, creeks, and rivers reached unprecedented levels.
Storm and sanitary sewer systems exceeded capacity and forced
water into the basements of hundreds of homes. In places
where the river crested and continued to rise, residents were
pulled to safety by firefighters, in boats, from second-story bedroom windows and rooftops. The media and meteorologists
were calling this a “hundred-year flood.”
As the time for the opening of court approached on Friday,
July 28, it soon became evident through the phone calls of
employees that many of them had suffered water damage in
their homes. Others were prevented from coming to work due
to the closure of major highways and roads. Fortunately, we
were able to open with a skeleton crew to handle the overnight
lockups, but full operation of the court was impossible due to
a lack of staff and ancillary services. Law-enforcement officers,
who were available, directed their resources to the flooded
areas.
The weekend provided enough relief time for many of the
lesser flooded areas to sufficiently clean up and become operational. Other areas of the city represented a microcosm of some
areas I viewed a few months ago in New Orleans.

On Monday morning, the court was 100% functional and
most employees returned to work. That morning also brought
to the forefront the obvious questioning of our ability to operate if a natural or man-made disaster caused devastation to
interrupt or suspend operation of the court. Coincidentally
and ironically, an e-mail was sent and delivered on the day of
our shutdown and opened by me, on Monday, eerily reflecting
the then-present predicament of our court.
The e-mail was sent by Pam Casey from the National Center
for State Courts inviting me, as president of the American
Judges Association, to appoint a representative for a national
coalition to guide a new project in the emergency management
area. Funded by the United States Bureau of Justice Assistance,
this project will develop a plan for the continuity
of court operation during an emergency. As
described by NCSC, this plan establishes
processes and procedures to quickly deploy predesignated personnel, equipment, vital records,
and supporting hardware and software to an
alternative site to sustain organizational operation for up to 30 days. The plan designates the
leadership decision process to determine the best
course of action for response, recovery, and
implementation of the continuity-of-operations procedures.
NCSC further states this will be a 19-month project for developing an online planning guide as well as a series of online curriculum modules to facilitate effective continuity of operations
planning for America’s courts.
Of course, any continuity-of-operations plan requires coordination with a variety of organizations and agencies such as
corrections, emergency management, law enforcement, the private bar, prosecution, public defender, and public health officials. Hopefully, this project will provide resources and
answers to assist courts in the event of a disaster, emergency, or
a pandemic flu.
How many times have we said to ourselves, “This kind of
disaster could never happen to us!” Well, I wasn’t around 100
years ago to see the last flood in my area, but I have lived
through, and experienced, this devastating flood and discovered we were ashamedly unprepared for its consequences. I
certainly urge your endorsement of the National Center for
State Courts’ efforts through the Bureau of Justice Assistance in
designing a blueprint to assist all of us when events require the
suspension of court operations.
Court Review 3
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BOOK REVIEW

A Judge’s Role
in the Rule of Law
William F. Hurst IV

Brian Z. Tamanaha, ON THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS,
THEORY. Cambridge University Press, 2004. 180 pp. $28.99.
Ronald A. Cass, RULE OF LAW IN AMERICA, THE. Johns Hopkins
University Press, 2001. 214 pp. $19.95.

P

resident Bush’s 2005 nominations to the Supreme Court
of the United States intensified the discussion over the
role of judges in the American judicial system. The
majority of that discussion has focused on the rule of law and
how it pertains to the scope of judicial power. As a nominee
before the Senate Judiciary Committee, now-Chief Justice John
Roberts proclaimed, “It is [the] rule of law that protects the
rights and liberties of all Americans. It is the envy of the world.
Because without the rule of law, any rights are meaningless.”
Two recently published books, On the Rule of Law: History,
Politics, Theory by Brian Z. Tamanaha, and The Rule of Law in
America by Ronald A. Cass, provide an in-depth analysis into
what the rule of law means today, its history, and what impact
its meaning has on the current American judiciary.
Tamanaha is quick to point out the uniqueness that exists
when it comes to the idea of the rule of law. The rule of law as
an ideal has received unprecedented endorsement that no
other single political idea has ever achieved. Chinese leaders
have supported the establishment of the rule of law in their
own country. President Bush is frequently quoted as supporting “democracy and the rule of law.” Iranian leaders have
embraced the importance of the rule of law. Even a former
Afghan warlord, campaigning for a position in the post-Taliban
government, was quoted as saying, “Now is the time to defend
ourselves not with tanks and armed corps but by the rule of
law.” Similar endorsements can be attributed to many more
political leaders, leaders of governments that seem to have very
little respect for the values, such as individual rights, capitalism, and democracy, that are essential to judicial system in the
United States.
One of the questions that Tamanaha attempts to answer is
what role the judge plays in the rule of law. In searching for
the answer, Tamanaha writes at great length about the history
of the rule and how it has developed as a concept throughout
the ages. Tamanaha describes how the rule of law was started
as a vague concept in Greek thought, how nobles used the idea
during the Middle Ages to protect themselves against the
tyranny of the kings, and how numerous political movements
and theorists had influence on what the rule of law means
today.
Of these movements, the classic liberalism movement of the
late-seventeenth and eighteenth centuries had the greatest
4 Court Review

impact on what is understood today to be the rule of law.
Classic liberalism stressed many ideas, such as individual liberty, capitalism, and government based on the consent of the
citizenry. In terms of the rule of law, however, it was key that
classic liberalism stressed a competitive interdependence
within the government. With the idea that no single institution should accumulate total power, liberals saw the division of
government into separate compartments as essential in the
preservation of liberty. This division of power included creating a supreme independent judiciary, one that could rein in the
other branches of government when they threatened the liberty of the citizenry. No single individual was above the law,
every citizen and government actor was accountable to the law.
This model of judicial independence is what today’s American
legal system is built upon. Many skeptics points out that such
a system does not always protect liberty as it was originally
designed to do, but Tamanaha points out while the system is
not perfect, “Law is the skeleton that holds the liberal system
upright and gives it form and stability.”
In a classic liberal system, judges were allocated a special
place as the final preservers of the rule of law. The laws of the
land were seen as being different from morality or politics in
the sense that they were not arbitrary or subject to the passions
of a few, but rather the laws were formed by the consent of the
citizenry, and it was the judge’s role to ensure that those laws
were followed. It was seen as the judge’s role not to change the
law or interpret it in a manner that best suited his desires. The
judge was seen as a mere conduit for announcing what the law
required.
The classic liberal ideal of the rule of law began to decline
with the increasing demand for a social welfare state in the end
of the nineteenth century and continuing throughout the late
twentieth century. One clear downside to the economics of
classic liberalism was that while it fostered an unprecedented
expansion of commercial activity, its rewards were spread
unequally, creating disparity among social classes. One of the
more glaring inequalities was the working poor toiling long
hours in abominable conditions, and doing so for little pay and
few benefits. This inequity appeared not only to be harsh but
grossly unfair, as those who benefited the most appeared to
labor the least and therefore be the least deserving.
In response to these inequities, governments began to shed
themselves of their laissez-faire economics and began to
increase the amount of economic regulation and social welfare.
This increase in the United States began in large part as a
response to the Great Depression, and except for intermittent
episodes of deregulation and welfare reform, has continued
into the new millennium. During this time, the rule of law

come under fire, as it was often viewed as a blockade for many
of the progressive changes that were sought by many during
the twentieth century.
The role of the judge changed dramatically during this
transformation. Judges in the social-welfare state were increasingly asked to apply open-ended standards like fairness, good
faith, reasonableness, and unconscionability. Judges were
often asked to engage in purposive reasoning in order to
achieve legislatively established policy goals. This change in
the role of the judiciary was seen by some observers as contrary to formal rule-of-law principles. Rather than simply
applying the law as it was written, many judges went outside
the domain of legal rules and legal reasoning to consult external sources of knowledge to discern the lay sense of justice.
Many decisions began to be based on political or economic
arguments, rather than the legal arguments that advocates of
the rule of law wished to see. Observers warned that the rule
of law was being threatened by having unelected judges make
decisions no different in kind from those made by legislatures.
In his book, Cass writes at length about what role a judge
should play in today’s modern understanding of the rule of law.
As one would expect, opinions differ greatly on what that role
should be. Cass divides the opinions into two camps. The first
is what Cass calls the partnership model of judging. This
model describes judges as substantially unconstrained, motivated by a complex sent of instincts, interest, and incentives.
As Cass points out, judges are seen as partners with other
branches of government, rightly granting substantial room to
choose among several legitimate, alternative decisional paths.
The opposing camp is the agency model of judging, which
finds judges’ decisions primarily governed by external legal
authority. The judges’ background, politics, and personal preferences do not disappear entirely, but rather are treated as incidental, not dominant factors. Judges perform their duties
removed from politics, constrained instead by forces that can

be characterized as belonging to a relatively autonomous
domain of law. Under this system, a judge is not allowed to do
what he or she thinks is best or what is the most appropriate
according to some principle divorced from positive law, but
instead the judge is directed to find the proper meaning for a
particular law. The agency model emphasizes that the judge’s
role is fixed irrespective of his or her own individual preferences.
Cass analyzes the evidence the supports both models, but
he concludes that most judges do not conform fully to either
polar model. There are institutional incentives that encourage
judges to follow whichever model they choose to follow. Most
notably absent, however, are binding constraints that would
prevent judges from injecting personal beliefs into decisions.
The influences that a judge uses in the decision-making
process depends wholly on the particular judge. While a judge
might face strong criticism for the use of particular influences
(such as international law), in most cases such criticism is the
maximum extent of negative repercussions that a judge would
face. This is especially true in the federal judiciary, where
judges have lifetime appointment and the threat of impeachment is almost nonexistent.
In conclusion, both books are unable to point to a specific
definition of the rule of law, nor is either able to say precisely
what role a judge plays within that definition. Perhaps that is
the point, however, as the prevailing theme of both books is
that the definition for the rule of law depends wholly on the
perspective of the definer. The same can be said for the role of
a judge, as it is a judge’s prerogative to decide exactly what role
to play within the judicial system. Tamanaha’s and Cass’s
works are excellent tools in grasping the array of approaches to
applying the rule of law in today’s judicial system.
William F. Hurst IV is a student editor for Court Review. He is a
third-year law student at the University of Kansas School of Law.
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Lessons from an
Unusual Retention Election
Shira J. Goodman and Lynn A. Marks

O

n November 8, 2005, something happened in
Pennsylvania that has never happened before: an
appellate judge, a supreme court justice no less, lost an
uncontested retention election. Not only was the loss unprecedented, but with the exception of one retention election in
1993, appellate justices and judges in Pennsylvania routinely
have won retention by margins of 70% to 30%. This year, one
justice lost his retention election and another barely won with
just 54% of the vote.
Retention elections have been a feature of judicial elections
in Pennsylvania since the state constitution was amended in
1969. Following election to an initial 10-year term, judges may
file to stand for retention in an uncontested, nonpartisan election, for successive 10-year terms until reaching the age of
mandatory retirement. Retention elections, by their very nature
(uncontested, nonpartisan, seemingly with foregone conclusions) traditionally have attracted little attention from the public and the media. Appellate justices and judges have not been
targeted in retention elections for decisions they had rendered
on the bench, and with one exception, were not identified as
judges who should be “voted out.”
Two thousand five was the year this changed. Typically, judicial elections, and retention elections in particular, are low
turnout elections. This year was no exception in that regard:
only 18.26% of registered Pennsylvania voters voted in Justice
Sandra Schultz Newman’s retention election, and only 17.87%
voted in Justice Russell Nigro’s retention election.1 What was
different was that voters paid attention to the retention elections and were motivated to vote “no” in a way they never had
before.
What accounts for this unprecedented event? It is difficult
to make broad generalizations from such a low-turnout election, but it seems that the retention elections turned into a referendum on the role of the courts in our system of governance
and the meaning of public service, especially as that relates to
compensation and the use of public funds. In addition, this
election took on special importance as a target of grass-roots
activists eager to send a message that populist action can lead
to tangible results. The court and the individual justices standing for retention likely would not have drawn such attention
were it not for the debate roiling around recent legislative
action regarding compensation for legislators, judges, and exec-

utive officials, and the lack of any other statewide races on the
ballot.
Given this special set of circumstances, some may be ready
to dismiss this election as an aberration. It is premature, however, to do so. History shows that judicial elections have tended
to become more partisan, more expensive, and more like contests for other elected offices, not less. This first retention election of note may mark a point of departure for retention elections in Pennsylvania and may have important consequences
for judicial selection in Pennsylvania going forward. Just as
important, the 2005 supreme court retention elections hold significant import for the ongoing relationship between the public
and the courts and point out that work needs to be done to
improve that relationship.

Footnotes
1. Pennsylvania Department of State, available at http://www.dos.state.
pa.us/bcel/site/default.asp.
2. PA. CONST. art. V, § 15(b).
3. In 1993, Justice Papadakos was the only justice standing for retention. It was a time when the state supreme court was dogged by
controversy that ultimately led to the impeachment of Justice Rolf

Larsen. Justice Papadakos was personally criticized for standing for
retention when he would only be able to serve one year before
reaching the mandatory age of retirement, for hiring his son as a law
clerk, and for having voted to increase judges’ pensions. Katherine
Seeyle, Papadakos Victory Sets New Low in Margin of Approval by
Voters, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Nov. 5, 1993.
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HISTORY OF RETENTION ELECTIONS IN PENNSYLVANIA

Pennsylvania began using retention elections as the method
for determining whether a previously elected justice or judge
would continue to serve on the bench following a constitutional change in 1969. To be retained, a judge must receive at
least a 50% “yes” vote.2 From the first appellate retention election following the constitutional amendment until 2005, no
appellate justice or judge failed to win enough votes to be
retained in office. In fact, in only one race did an appellate justice not receive an overwhelming majority vote in favor of
retention; in 1993, Supreme Court Justice Nicholas P.
Papadakos retained his seat, but only 55% of the voters voted in
favor of retention.3
With the exception of 1993, retention elections in
Pennsylvania have not attracted widespread interest or attention. There were no major campaigns in favor of or against
statewide justices or judges standing for retention, and the
jurists did not raise funds to cover campaign costs. Essentially,
retention elections were non-events. Even when retention
races started heating up in other states, we in Pennsylvania considered ourselves somewhat insulated from the activities that
were being observed elsewhere.
WHAT’S BEEN HAPPENING IN RETENTION ELECTIONS
ACROSS THE NATION

Throughout the nation, retention elections have become
more contentious as various groups have targeted judges who

have authored opinions or rendered decisions with which the
groups have disagreed. Typically, such elections have focused
on specific criminal sentencing decisions, abortion issues, and
gay marriage.
In its 2003 report Justice in Jeopardy, the ABA Commission
on the 21st Century Judiciary highlighted the threats it
observed to state judges standing for retention or reelection:
“[I]t is incumbents who are put at future risk of losing their
tenure when they uphold unpopular laws, invalidate popular
laws, or protect the rights of unpopular litigants. In such cases,
it is incumbents who are thus presented with the impossible
choice of sacrificing either their careers, or their independence
and the rule of law.”4 The ABA Commission bolstered this finding with evidence from retention elections throughout the
nation:
• In 1992, Florida Justice Rosemary Barkett’s retention was
opposed by the National Rifle Association and a group of
prosecutors and police officers, on the grounds that she was
“soft on crime.”
• In 1995, a sitting South Carolina justice was challenged for
the first time in over a century, on the grounds that she was
“soft on crime.”
• In 1996, the Tennessee Conservative Union and other
groups successfully campaigned for the defeat of Tennessee
Justice Penny White on account of a decision she joined
overturning a death sentence. In the next election cycle,
Justice Adolpho Birch, Jr. resisted a challenge to his retention
based upon his decision in the same case.
• In the 1998 California Supreme Court elections, Chief
Justice Ronald George and Justice Ming Chin withstood
challenges to their retention based on their rulings in abortion cases.
• In Florida, Justice Leander Shaw’s retention was opposed on
the basis of his ruling in an abortion case.
• In Ohio in 1998, opposition to Justice Paul Pfeifer focused
on his decision in a school-funding case decided under the
Ohio Constitution (and was an ancillary issue in the reelection battle of Resnick in 2000).5
The 2002 retention elections in Illinois and Missouri also
were heated affairs. In Illinois, three circuit judges, fearing
possible opposition, raised money for a planned television
campaign to support their retention efforts.6 In 2004, retention elections were major focal points in four states: Missouri,
Arizona, Iowa, and Kansas. In Iowa, Judge Jeffrey Neary was
targeted “because he granted a ‘divorce’ to a lesbian couple

4. ABA Comm. on the 21st Century Judiciary, Justice in Jeopardy, at
24-25 (2003).
5. Id. at 25-28.
6. Trisha L. Howard, “Three Illinois Circuit Judges Raise $155,000 for
Retention Campaigns; Amount Dwarfs Figures for Madison County
in 2000,” ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Oct. 22, 2002.
7. Rekha Basu, “Basu: Justice Is for Judges, Too,” DES MOINES REGISTER,
Oct. 12, 2004.
8. Margaret Ebrahim, “The Bible Bench: The Message from
Fundamentalists to State Jurists Is Clear: Judge Conservatively, Lest
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related to any
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decisions they
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Teitleman
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part in . . . .
because of his allegedly “liberal activism,” but he too won
retention.9 In Kansas, District Court Judge Paula Martin was
retained, despite a campaign against her based on her sentencing decisions.10 “The campaign [against Martin] was the first
time in county history a judge faced formal opposition heading into a retention election.”11 In Arizona, Maricopa County
Superior Court Judges Ken Fields and William Sargeant were
the targets of “vote no” campaigns based on their decisions in
some abortion cases.12 The leader of the anti-retention effort
admitted that “he couldn’t say either judge has a pattern of bad
decisions. The campaign is based largely on the two abortionrelated decisions.”13 Despite the campaign, both Fields and
Sargeant were retained.
Pennsylvanians had felt fortunate that our retention elections had not become so polarizing or politicized. Indeed, in
drafting merit-selection proposals for the statewide appellate
courts and even the local courts in Philadelphia, legislative
sponsors and Pennsylvanians for Modern Courts (“PMC”) had
always provided for a retention election following an initial
term in office. PMC had hoped that retention elections in
Pennsylvania would remain an opportunity for voters to weigh
in on the judge’s performance on the bench, his or her fairness,
his or her treatment of litigants and witnesses, and the quality
of his or her work.
As will be seen below, the nature of retention elections in
Pennsylvania has now changed somewhat, but not in the way
many had predicted or expected. PMC, however, still believes
that retention elections are an important part of the judicial
selection process, whether that process remains electoral or is
transformed into a merit-selection system.
WHAT HAPPENED IN 2005 IN PENNSYLVANIA?

In light of recent retention battles in other states, we
expected that any interest in retention elections in Pennsylvania
would be generated by controversial decisions rendered by

Ye Not Be a Judge,” MOTHER JONES, May 2006 at 54.
9. Id. See also Donna Walter, “Supporters Rally to Defense of Missouri
Supreme Court Judge Richard B. Teitelman,” DLY. REC. (Kansas City,
Mo.), Nov. 1, 2004.
10. Eric Weslander, “Embattled District Judge Stays on Bench,”
LAWRENCE (KAN.) JOURNAL-WORLD, Nov. 3, 2004.
11. Id.
12. Richard Ruelas, “Judge an Unexpected Target,” ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Nov.
1, 2004.
13. Id.
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judges during their tenure.
Indeed, it appears that
Justice Russell Nigro, one of
the two supreme court justices up for retention in
2005, shared these concerns. In the months preceding his retention election, his campaign committee raised funds in anticipation of having to run a campaign to address negative
comments about some of
his rulings.14 As will be seen, however, the interest in the retention elections and the targeting of Justice Nigro (and Justice
Newman) were not directly related to any decisions they
authored or took part in while serving on the high court.
Justice Nigro’s fundraising was unprecedented and controversial. Justice Nigro promised that he would only use the
funds in the event he needed to respond to “an attack,” and
promised to return any unused funds. “If no attack occurs, he
said, all of the money raised for a defensive ad campaign would
be returned ‘dollar for dollar’ to donors.”15
At the time Justice Nigro’s fundraising became public, it was
still widely assumed that any threat to the justices’ retention
bids would result from special-interest groups unhappy with
particular decisions. One of the coordinators of Justice Nigro’s
fundraising campaign explained, “’He wants to have enough in
the bank so that if he has to conduct a six-to-eight-week concentrated media campaign to answer some off-the-wall out-ofstate group, he will have enough money to do that.’”16
Similarly, the Chancellor of the Philadelphia Bar Association at
the time stated, “‘I hope that we don’t have what has occurred
in other states—a single issue or agenda-driven campaign.’”17
Instead, the retention elections became a focal point of public interest because they were the only elections for statewide
office this election cycle. Public discontent surrounding lateterm legislation raising the pay of state legislators, judges, and
executive-branch officials was reaching a critical level.
Ironically, as will be discussed, a plan initially intended to
divorce judicial compensation from the political process
resulted in broad legislation affecting all three branches of government, allegations of a judiciary too closely tied to the legislature, and the use of the political process to punish judges.

Ultimately, the campaign committees of both Justice Nigro
and Justice Newman raised substantial funds to support their
retention campaigns,18 although Justice Newman did not do so
until just before the election.

14. L. Stuart Ditzen, Judge Is Preparing for a Tough Election,
PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, July 24, 2005.
15. Id. Justice Newman, the other justice standing for retention, decided
not to raise any campaign funds but in the last weeks preceding the
election, she changed that strategy and her campaign did raise and
spend significant sums of money.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. A complaint was filed challenging the propriety of some of the contributions as well as the Nigro campaign’s compliance with reporting
requirements. PA CleanSweep filed a complaint with the
Department of State contending that several contributions to Justice
Nigro’s retention campaign violated the state’s campaign-finance law.

Charles Thompson, Group Files Complaints Over Judge’s Campaign,
THE PATRIOT-NEWS, Oct. 21, 2005. (At the time of this writing, the
State Department was investigating the complaint and the propriety
of the challenged contributions under the applicable campaignfinance regulations).
19. Chief Justice Ralph Cappy, A Collaborative Effort of All Three
Branches of State Government Led to a Newly Enacted Compensation
System that Is Right for Pennsylvania, July 20, 2005, available at
http://www.courts.state.pa.us/index/Aopc/PressReleases/opedrjc.720.asp.
20. Id.; see also Act of July 7, 2005, P.L. 201, No 44 (repealed Nov. 16,
2005, §§ 1802-1808 (“Act 44”).
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THE UNEXPECTED ISSUE IN THE RETENTION ELECTIONS
— THE PAY RAISE OF 2005

In fall 2004, Pennsylvania Chief Justice Ralph Cappy began
the process of seeking a pay raise for Pennsylvania’s justices and
judges. Excluding annual cost-of-living increases, the judiciary
had not received a pay raise in 10 years. As part of this process,
Chief Justice Cappy also proposed that judicial pay in
Pennsylvania be pegged to compensation for members of the
federal bench. As he explained:
Properly structured, such coupling would recognize
the similarity in responsibilities between state judges and
their federal counterparts and would make state judges’
remuneration commensurate with our federal brethren.
On the “front” side of the equation, this linkage would
go far in attracting superior candidates to the judiciary
just as it would help retain judges who had begun to consider alternative career options. Perhaps most importantly, such a plan would take politics out of the pay raise
issue forever.19
Under his proposal, the judiciary would no longer be forced
to come to the legislature seeking raises. Instead, when federal
salaries for judges increased, state salaries would increase as
well. Chief Justice Cappy’s plan did not propose that appellate
and trial-level state court judges receive the same salary as their
counterparts on the federal district and appellate courts.
Instead, state supreme court justices would receive the same
salary as federal circuit court judges; intermediate appellate
court judges in Pennsylvania would receive the same salary as
federal district judges; and common pleas court judges would
receive the same salary as federal magistrate judges.20
This plan had much to recommend it. The Pennsylvania
judiciary had not regularly received pay raises; each time such
a raise was sought it became tangled up with legislative pay
raises. This new plan would enable the judiciary to maintain
some independence from the legislative branch by eliminating
the need for the judges to go “hat in hand” to the legislators.
Instead, the compensation of state judges would increase on a
par with that of federal judges.

Chief Justice Cappy’s request for a judicial pay raise and proposal of a new way to set judicial compensation was behavior
typical of the leader of the judicial branch. Just as the chief justices of the U.S. and of other state courts must act as advocates
for the judges and the courts, Chief Justice Cappy asked for a
raise for his colleagues and proposed a plan for avoiding such
awkward requests in the future.
It is difficult to explain exactly what happened next, because
it did not happen during public hearings or open sessions of the
legislature. Somehow, however, at the last moment, late at
night, just before the legislature adjourned for the summer,
broad legislation affecting compensation for members of all
three branches of government, including the judiciary, was
enacted: “The Legislature just gave itself, top state officials and
judges pay raises up to 34 percent. Gov. Ed [Rendell] approved
them. This was done without public review or a word of debate
just after 2 a.m. on July 7.”21 The secretive, nonpublic nature
of the passage of the pay-raise legislation generated considerable criticism among the public and the media. State
Representative Greg Vitali, a vocal critic of the pay-raise legislation who later would participate as a plaintiff in a lawsuit
challenging the legislation’s constitutionality, characterized the
passage of the legislation this way:
The pay raise bill should have been read and discussed in public on three different days in the House and
again in the Senate before the vote July 7. . . . That didn’t
happen, as legislative leaders kept the details secret
before the 2 a.m. vote was finally held. “If the Legislature
had been forced to discuss the raise in public before the
vote, the raise never would have happened.”22
As noted above, the discussions and negotiations leading up
to the drafting and amending of the bill were not public, and
the extent of Chief Justice Cappy’s participation in them is not
clear. However, several sources have identified Chief Justice
Cappy as being very involved in designing the concept of the
pay raise. For example, in an op-ed piece defending his decision to sign the pay-raise legislation into law, Governor Edward
G. Rendell wrote:
This legislation, particularly the concept of linking
state salaries to a percentage of those paid equivalent federal officials, emanated from an idea put forth by our fine
Supreme Court Chief Justice Ralph Cappy.23
Chief Justice Cappy’s lawyer, in a letter to the Judicial Conduct
Board made public by the Administrative Office of
Pennsylvania Courts following the dismissal of a complaint

21. John M. Baer, Scales of Justice Are Over His Eyes, PHILADELPHIA DAILY
NEWS, July 21, 2005.
22. Tom Barnes, Anger Over Pay Spelled Defeat for Justice Nigro,
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Nov. 10, 2005.
23. Edward G. Rendell, Why I Approved These Pay Raises; The Bill
Creates a System for Just Pay Across Government, PITTSBURGH POSTGAZETTE, July 9, 2005.
24. Letter of W. Thomas McGough, Jr., Esq., on behalf of Chief Justice
Ralph J. Cappy, to Joseph A. Massa, Esq., Chief Counsel of the
Judicial Conduct Board of Pa, Nov. 11, 2005, available at
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all three branches. He therefore developed and began to
discuss scenarios that would tie pay in those branches to
counterparts in the federal system.24
The ultimate result of all this activity, Act 44, raised the compensation for all state judges, legislators, and many executivebranch officials. Chief Justice Cappy’s plan of tying the compensation of the state judiciary to federal levels was accepted
and adapted to apply to legislators as well. Members of the
Pennsylvania House and Senate would receive an annual salary
equal to 50% of the annual salary paid to members of the
United States House of Representatives.25 Legislative officers
and leaders would receive a greater percentage of the federal
salary, and all members would be eligible for cost-of-living
adjustments.26
In addition, one portion of Act 44 raised particular attention
from the media, the public, and several government watchdog
groups after the fact: Although the state constitution prohibits
legislators from raising their own compensation during their
term,27 the legislators inserted into Act 44 a provision enabling
them to begin receiving the increased salary immediately in the
form of “unvouchered expenses.”
1107. Additional Expenses
(a) Senate
(1) Beginning on the effective date of this subsection
and ending November 30, 2008, a member of the
Senate shall receive monthly, in addition to any
allocation for clerical assistance and other actual
expenses, an unvouchered expense allocation in
the amount of 1/12 of the difference between:
(i) the amount specified for a member in:
(A) section 1102(a) (relating to members of
the General Assembly) plus section 1104
(relating to cost of living) as appropriate;

http://www.courts.state.pa.us/Index/Aopc/PressReleases/prrel06213.
asp.
25. Act 44, § 1102 (a) & (b).
26. Id. at §§ 1102 -1104. Act 44 also tied the salaries of executivebranch officials, including the governor, to the compensation of
members of the federal executive branch.
27. “No member of either House shall during the term for which he may
have been elected, receive any increase in salary, or mileage, under
any law passed during such term.” PA CONST. art. 11, § 8.
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or (B) section 1103(a) (relating
to legislative officers and leaders) plus section 1104 as appropriate; and
(ii) the amount calculated for
that member as of the effective
date of this subparagraph pursuant to the act of September
30, 1983 (P.L. 160, No. 39),
known as the Public Official
Compensation Law.28

Similar language granted the same payments to members of the
House of Representatives.29
Years earlier, in 1986, the legislature had also used
unvouchered expenses as part of their increase in compensation. This measure had been challenged, and ultimately upheld
by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Consumer Party of
Pennsylvania v Commonwealth.30 The court drew a distinction
between salary and expenses, concluding that the use of
unvouchered expenses did not constitute an increase in salary.31
The reaction to the pay-raise legislation, and the manner in
which it was enacted, was sharp and immediate. Many in the
media were angry, and the public was roused to action.
Lawsuits were filed in federal and state court challenging the
pay-raise legislation.32
Like Governor Rendell, Chief Justice Cappy made public
statements supporting the legislation. In a press release issued
by the Administrative Office of Pennsylvania Courts, Chief
Justice Cappy stated:
“Raising public officials’ salaries is never popular and
there is never the ‘right time’ to do so. . . . Doing so now
was an act of courage by legislators, legislative leaders
and Gov. Rendell and I must acknowledge their leadership on a difficult issue.”33
Chief Justice Cappy was also widely quoted as calling public
reaction to the pay raise “knee-jerk.”34 A complaint was filed
with the Judicial Conduct Board alleging that Justice Cappy’s
role in designing and defending the legislation was improper.35
The Judicial Conduct Board ultimately found the charges to be
without merit and dismissed the claim.36

28. Act 44, § 1107(a).
29. Id. at § 1107(b).
30. 510 Pa. 158 (1986).
31. Id. at 184-85.
32. For a discussion of these suits, see infra at nn. 54-58.
33. Administrative Office of Pennsylvania Courts, Legislation Enhances
Ability to Attract and Retain Quality Judges: Chief Justice Applauds
Legislature and Governor for Enacting New Salary Structure, July 8,
2005, available at http://www.courts.state.pa.us/Index/Aopc/
IndexAOPC.asp.
34. Mark Scolforo, Justice Calls Voter Outrage Over Raises “Knee-Jerk,”
ASSOCIATED PRESS, July 20, 2005.
35. Cappy Targeted for Role in Pay-Jacking, VALLEY INDEPENDENT NEWS,
Aug. 18, 2005. On February 13, 2006, the Judicial Conduct Board
publicly announced: “In August 2005, the Judicial Conduct Board of
Pennsylvania received allegations that Chief Justice Ralph J. Cappy
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Following these events, there was a pervasive sentiment that
the courts would not look favorably on challenges to the payraise legislation, given previous decisions, including Consumer
Party, in which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had upheld
previous legislation facing similar challenges to its mode of passage and the use of unvouchered expenses.37
New citizen groups sprang up, motivated to do something to
demonstrate that business as usual could not go on any longer
in Harrisburg. Some called for a repeal of the legislation. One
group, PACleanSweep, was founded in July 2005 with the goal
of replacing every Pennsylvania legislator standing for reelection in 2006.38 Others shared and still share that sentiment and
goal, but in 2005, no legislators were up for reelection. Indeed,
only two officials who are voted on by the entire state were on
the ballot—Justices Nigro and Newman, who were standing for
retention.
ELECTION SEASON

As the summer continued and anger over the pay raises did
not dissipate, but rather intensified, those calling for ouster of
the politicians soon found a new target—Justices Nigro and
Newman:
Anger unleashed by the legislative pay raise has given
rise to a familiar refrain: Remember in November. The
problem, for citizen activist groups, is that lawmakers are
not up for reelection till next year.
But some activists are now saying that voters can still
make their voices heard in November by removing two
members of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
They argue that the high court, whose members will
benefit from the pay raise, has allowed the General
Assembly to routinely pass bills that violate the state constitution.39
Tim Potts, founder of Democracy Rising PA,40 began the
campaign against the justices, arguing ‘“The governor and the
legislature do what they do because the Supreme Court says it’s
OK. . . . Over and over, they have given their blessing to stealth
legislation.’”41 Potts pledged to begin an internet-based campaign to defeat the retention campaigns of Justices Nigro and
Other anti-pay-raise groups, including
Newman.42
PACleanSweep, pledged to support Potts’ efforts.43

violated the Code of Judicial Conduct through his involvement with
the legislative pay raise. The Board unanimously determined that
the allegations were without merit and dismissed the claim.”
Judicial Conduct Board, Press Release, Feb. 13, 2006.
36. Id.
37. Of course, as the court of last resort, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court, can reexamine the issue of unvouchered expenses and either
distinguish or overrule Consumer Party.
38. See PACleanSweep.com, press release, Aug. 15, 2005.
39. Amy Worden, New Target for Anger Over Raises: Judges, THE
PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Sept. 23, 2005.
40. See http://www.democracyrisingpa.com.
41. Worden, supra note 39.
42. Id.
43. Id.

At the time Potts announced his campaign, “[Justices]
Newman and Nigro said they knew of no campaign against
them and had no plans to publicly defend their records.”44
Justice Newman at that point still was not planning to raise any
campaign funds or campaign for retention, and Justice Nigro
had not spent any of the money he had raised and would “wait
and see” before mounting a responsive campaign.45
The allegations that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was, at
least partially, to blame for the legislature’s actions were not new.
In the past, the court had upheld other legislation in the face of
constitutional challenges to the manner in which the legislature
had enacted it. (Of course, the court also had struck down
much legislation in the past as well, a fact that was often forgotten during discussions about the pay-raise legislation.) The
Consumer Party decision in 1986, decided before either Justice
Nigro or Justice Newman was on the court, had upheld the use
of unvouchered expenses by the legislature. This history, coupled with Chief Justice Cappy’s role in and defense of the payraise legislation, combined to create an impression of the court
being too close to, or at least too accepting of, the legislature.46
Adding to dissatisfaction with the courts was an examination,
less than two months before the election, of the reimbursement
forms submitted by Pennsylvania Supreme Court justices for
expenses they incurred. The Harrisburg Patriot-News reported
that the seven justices were reimbursed for more than $164,000
in one year.47 It pointed out that these expenses were in addition to the justices’ salaries and a generous benefits package that
included up to $600 per month for a car lease.48
The Patriot-News and follow-up articles in papers throughout the state also highlighted certain expense reimbursements
that seemed to many to be out of line or inappropriate. One
expense that was frequently cited by the media was Justice
Nigro’s request for reimbursement for at least 115 meals during
which court-related business was conducted:
No one wants high-powered lawyers to be buying dinner for someone who serves the public on the supreme
court, but did Justice Russell Nigro really conduct
“court-related business” at 115 meals charged to the taxpayers? And those dinners that cost him $100, $200 and
even more than $400—are they the kind of meals at the

44. Id.
45. Id.
46. See, e.g., id. (“‘The Governor and the legislature do what they do
because the Supreme Court says it’s OK,’ Potts said. ‘Over and over,
they have given their blessing to stealth legislation.’”); Tom Barnes,
In Furor Over Pay Raise, Sights Are Set on Judges, PITTSBURGH POSTGAZETTE, Oct. 10, 2005 (“But leaders of grass-roots groups such as
PACleanSweep, based in Lebanon County, and Democracy Rising
Pa., based in Cumberland County . . . claim the Supreme Court has
a tradition of upholding what critics consider to be questionable, if
not unconstitutional, actions by the Legislature.”).
47. Jan Murphy, State Justices Resort to Big Expenses, THE PATRIOT-NEWS,
Sept. 18, 2005.
48. Id.
49. State of Greed/Pennsylvanians Pay for the Court’s High Life,
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Sept. 21, 2005; see also Jan Murphy, State
Justices Resort to Big Expenses, THE PATRIOT-NEWS, Sept. 18, 2005;
Stu Bykofsky, Supremes Suffer from “Robe-it is,” PHILADELPHIA DAILY
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Justice
Newman’s
expenses didn’t draw the
same attention as Justice
Nigro’s, although she was
criticized for the generous
tips and also the seemingly
inexpensive food purchases for which she sought reimbursement.50 Other justices’ expenses, such as Justice Thomas
Saylor’s request for reimbursement for 34 car washes,51 drew
attention and criticism, but it was Justice Nigro’s expenses that
the media highlighted.
Thus, what started out as a seemingly routine retention election became a campaign in which Justices Nigro and Newman
were fighting to retain their seats. Both resorted to media buys
in the days leading up to the election, including public endorsements of Justice Newman by former Governor Ridge.52 All of
this activity was unprecedented in the realm of appellate court
retention elections in Pennsylvania.
By the time election day arrived, Justices Nigro and Newman
had spent a combined total of more than $800,000; the bulk of
the expenditures were in the two weeks leading up to election
day.53 As noted above, Justice Newman was retained with 54%
of the vote; Justice Nigro failed to win retention, receiving only
49% of the vote. Interestingly, the local judges up for retention
were not targeted for “no votes,” and all were retained.
POSTSCRIPT: THE PAY-RAISE REPEAL AND
THE OUTCOME OF THE LITIGATION

During the fall, in response to the unrelenting attention and
pressure of the media and the public uproar about the pay-raise
legislation, the legislature debated repealing it. Differences over

NEWS, Nov. 3, 2005.
50. John Baer, It’s a Feast Out There for Judges, PHILADELPHIA DAILY NEWS,
Oct. 1, 2005 (“Newman’s charges are more modest but annoying.
She charges for her AOL and Comcast hookups, for her On Star service and for $10 tips to hotel bellhops and doormen.”); see Bykofsky,
supra note 49.
51. Report: Taxpayers Footing Big Bills Racked Up by Pa. High Court
Justices, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Sept. 19, 2005.
52. Peter Jackson, For First Time, Pa. Voters Oust a Supreme Court
Justice, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 9, 2005 (“Nigro raised more than
$400,000 for his campaign. He aired TV ads that sought to distance
himself from lawmakers, stating that he had ‘voted to overturn the
Legislature when they’ve been wrong.’ Newman, a Republican, took
in more than $240,000 last week alone, and sponsored ads featuring a voiceover by Tom Ridge, the former Pennsylvania governor
and former national Homeland Security secretary.”).
53. Mark Scolforo, Justices Spent Heavily in Lead-Up to Election,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Dec. 13, 2005.
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whether to repeal the judges’
raises as well as the legislators’
raises held up passage, and no
compromise was reached in
advance of election day. However,
the week after the election, the
legislature finally resolved to
repeal the pay-raise legislation.
Act 72, repealing the pay-raise
legislation, was passed on
November 1654 and signed by the
Governor.
The movement toward repeal was not enough to quiet the
“vote no” campaign, and it also failed to end the pay-raise controversy. Soon after the repeal became effective, several lawsuits
were filed by judges across Pennsylvania challenging the constitutionality of the repeal as it related to judges.55 In addition
to seeking to have the pay raises for judges reinstated, the lawsuits highlighted the critical need to separate judicial compensation from the legislative process.56 The suits were consolidated and were argued before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
in early April 2006, along with Gene Stilp’s lawsuit challenging
the original pay-raise legislation.
The judges’ challenges to the repeal hinged on the provision
of the Pennsylvania Constitution that prohibits reducing a
judge’s salary while he or she is in office: “Justices, judges and
justices of the peace shall be compensated by the
Commonwealth as provided by law. Their compensation shall
not be diminished during their terms of office, unless by law
applying generally to all salaried officers of the
Commonwealth.” The judges’ claim was based on the fact that
although the repeal affected all officials who had received a
raise through Act 44, some officials had not received such a
raise and thus did not have their salaries reduced by the repeal.
In September 2006, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court,
accepting the judges’ constitutional argument, held that the
repeal of the pay raises was unconstitutional as to the judges.57
The court also found, however, that the unvouchered-expense
portion of the legislative raises was unconstitutional. While
finding Act 44 unconstitutional in part, the Court refused to
apply the nonseverability clause of the pay-raise legislation. As
a result, the provisions of Act 44 relating to judicial compensation were held to remain in force.
During the litigation and following the court’s decision,
there had been criticism that the justices were deciding a case
affecting their own compensation. In response, by defenders of
the court and the court itself, it was explained that under the
“doctrine of necessity,” there was no alternative, and that
despite their own interest, the justices were required to deter-

mine the case impartially. As Judge Anne Lazarus, chairwoman
of the Ethics Committee of the State Conference of Trial Judges,
explained in an interview: “[The rule of necessity] holds that
whenever all judges in a particular court are touched by the
same conflict ‘it is necessary for a judge, even if conflicted, to
handle the controversy.’”58 While legally correct, this further
agitated the public and those calling for ousting all elected officials, including judges.

54. Act of Nov. 16, 2005, P.L. 385, No. 72 (“Act 72”).
55. A third lawsuit was filed challenging the entire repeal, as applied to
judges, legislators, and executive-branch officials. To date, that suit
has not been consolidated with the others or addressed by the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Common Cause of Pennsylvania also
filed a lawsuit in federal district court challenging the constitutionality of the pay-raise legislation. That suit was dismissed this spring,
Common Cause of Pennsylvania v. Commonwealth, 447 F. Supp. 2d 415

(M.D. Pa. 2006), but has been appealed.
56. Herron v. Commonwealth of Pa., Supreme Court of Pa. Docket No.
48-EAP-2005 (Brief of Appellant, at 1).
57. Stilp v. Commonwealth, 905 A.2d 918 (2006), rehearing denied
(Nov. 8, 2006). Chief Justice Cappy did not participate in the decision.
58. Thompson, supra n. 29.
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WHAT DOES IT ALL MEAN?

It is difficult to draw sweeping lessons from a low-turnout
election in which there was not wide polling of voters. But,
judging from the tenor of the debate and the arguments being
made, PMC has discerned a central theme defining the 2005
retention elections. Significantly, this theme is not new, and the
sentiments it represents have not been resolved.
A FAILURE TO COMMUNICATE

PMC attributes the events of 2005 to a collision of incongruous perceptions about the court system and its role in our
system of government: the public and the judges (and their
defenders) have very different views about the courts and our
governmental system of checks and balances. In fact, when one
reads what the “two sides” have to say about the situation, they
seem to be talking about entirely different things. And, certainly, they are not really talking to each other. This underscores
a major problem—the isolation of courts and judges from the
people they serve.
All the publicity about judicial elections, federal appointments, activist judges, and high-profile cases has obscured a
basic truth—the public does not really know all that much
about judges and courts. A corresponding problem is that once
on the bench, judges often become isolated from the public and
seemingly “out of touch” with the common experience. In
combination, these factors produce a condition ripe for explosive results when issues of compensation, expenditures by public officials, and political maneuvering arise.
Even now, the two sides seem miles apart in their assessment
of what happened last fall. Judges and their defenders (mostly
lawyers and the organized bar) seem not to understand the
public outrage connected with the pay raise and why any part
of it was directed at the court.
For example, one lawyer, in an effort to exhort fellow
lawyers to support the courts, defended the chief justice’s role
in designing the pay raise and attacked the results of the retention election:
For almost six months there has been a persistent,
unrelenting diatribe from many in the print media across
the Commonwealth attacking our chief justice, our

Supreme Court and our judiciary in general. The diatribe is frequently misleading, occasionally tasteless,
often threatening and evidences an alarming illiteracy as
to the operable provisions of the Pennsylvania constitution.59
This lawyer then criticized the vote against Justice Nigro’s
retention as “an irrational act, which again was the result of
actions by those who would undermine confidence in our justice system.”60 This echos Justice Nigro’s own assessment of his
electoral defeat: “What they did was an irrational thing. They
sent a misguided missile.”61
Furthermore, the judges and their defenders seem not to
understand why their efforts to attack the pay-raise repeal and
the court’s ultimate decision in the case, regardless of the legal
merits, were so distasteful to the public. This failure to understand, and the insistence on viewing the public’s ire as misdirected and the court and judiciary as scapegoats can only lead
to further alienation and confrontation.
On the other side, the public seems not to understand, or at
least to have lost faith in, the courts’ role in the system of checks
and balances. The public seems unable to grasp that judges are
deserving of a pay raise and that Chief Justice Cappy’s request
for such a raise was reasonable and part of his duties. The real
problem, which has been lost in the controversy, is that judges
are beholden to the other branches of government for their
compensation. Rather than respect this bind and act responsibly to ensure that our judges are fairly compensated, the legislature traditionally has piggy-backed its own raises onto the
bills related to judges’ compensation. As a result, lost in the
pay-raise, retention, and repeal controversies were Chief Justice
Cappy’s reasonable plan to end this cycle of long periods without pay raises followed by turmoil over any ultimate legislation
increasing compensation.
Essentially, this is a classic failure to communicate. The
courts are perceived as having lost touch with the people they
serve, and the people found the retention election was the only
way to effectively communicate their lack of faith in the system.
Another way must be found. Targeting judges for “no” votes
when they stand for retention because of frustration about the
courts, or about government in general, in the long run
deprives Pennsylvania of good judges with solid experience. It
may be part of our tradition, but it should not remain part of
our future.
THE FUTURE OF RETENTION ELECTIONS

Retention elections, however, should remain part of
Pennsylvania’s judicial selection system, whether electoral or
merit selection. Retention elections guarantee a role for the
public in the critically important judicial selection process.
While retention elections certainly can provide the opportunity
for misguided attacks, they also offer a voice to the people and
a real way to pass on a judge’s performance as a judge.

59. Edward W. Madeira, Jr., Chief Justice, Courts Deserve More Support
from Legal Community, THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Jan. 30, 2006.
60. Id.

Retention elections should not be referenda on hot-button
issues or a way to attack the only official up for election; but if
the right information gets out, if voters can be educated, it
could be a true assessment of how the judge is doing his or her
job. Does she treat all fairly and with respect—litigants, witnesses, jurors, court personnel? Is the judge efficient in adjudicating cases? Is the judge respected by the lawyers who practice before her, even when she rules against them? How often
is the judge overturned on appeal? How is the courtroom
run—efficiently, with respect to the parties involved, or simply
to serve the judge’s schedule? Has the judge made efforts to be
out in the community—to educate and help the public learn
about courts and judges?
Perhaps the best way to look at retention elections is as an
opportunity for judges and the public to educate each other.
The public can educate the judge about its concerns for fair and
impartial courts, for strong courts that will ensure that the constitutional system of checks and balances works, for efficient
and effective courts. And the judge can educate the public
about what he or she does on the bench, how she views her
role, what she has learned during the preceding term. This type
of education, and communication, is sorely needed. But not
only during retention time. There should be an ongoing conversation between the public and the judiciary, not about specific cases and controversial issues, but about systemic issues
and the role of the courts in our system of government.
If we have these conversations, perhaps retention elections
can begin to fill the role they were always meant to play—neither a non-event rubberstamp for another 10 years in office, nor
a targeted campaign based on specific decisions or more general
discontent with government. Instead, retention elections can
fill a void in our system—providing information so that the
public and the judiciary no longer hold incongruous views of
the courts and their role in our system of government.
CONCLUSION

Real issues must be addressed if Pennsylvania is to have
strong courts that have the confidence of the public. Two items
should be examined as part of this effort. First is the potential
use of judicial evaluation committees. Second, in the wake of
ambiguity in the court’s decision about the permanence of the
mechanism of tying state judicial salaries to federal levels as
well as recent proclamations by state legislators that they will
essentially “undo” the effect of the court’s decision and find a
way to bring judicial salaries back to pre-pay-raise levels, there
is a need to discuss a new means of setting judicial compensation. PMC is eager to explore both of these concepts, which
have been employed successfully in other jurisdictions.
The first, judicial evaluation committees, would be formal
committees established by law and charged with evaluating
judges’ standing for retention. Evaluations would be based on
the factors described above, including experience on the bench,
efficiency, demeanor, and the opinions of fellow jurists and

61. L. Stuart Ditzen, Nigro Calls Vote to Oust Him “An Irrational Thing,”
PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Nov. 10, 2005.
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practicing lawyers. The ratings and recommendations would
be shared with the public, so that voters would be educated and
informed when entering the voting booth during retention elections.
The second concept, finding a new way to set judicial compensation, would seek to divorce permanently the process of
setting judicial compensation from the state legislature. This,
in effect, would achieve what Chief Justice Cappy originally
intended, eliminating for all time the need for the courts to go
asking for raises from the legislature. Possible solutions include
setting up an independent judicial compensation commission,
tying judicial salaries to some outside index, or even implementing Chief Justice Cappy’s proposal to tie judicial salaries to
those paid to members of the federal judiciary. The point is that
the judicial compensation process we have now is not working.
There needs to be a change.
The public needs to have confidence in our courts. This is a
big challenge, particularly in the wake of the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court’s decision in the pay-raise case. But the work
of repairing the damaged relationship can and should begin
now. We need and welcome willing partners in the judiciary
and the public. We know that many within the judiciary and
the court system are interested in having this dialogue, as are
members of local and statewide bar associations. We hope we
can broaden the conversation and work together to ensure that
we have strong courts in Pennsylvania.
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Judicial Elections:
Changes and Challenges
Jan Witold Baran

T

oday, myriad approaches for selecting judges exist and
few states—if any at all—use identical schemes. In many
states, the selection methods vary depending on whether
the judge is a trial or appellate judge, or an initial selection or
an incumbent. As will be seen, the vast majority of state judges
are elected. Recently, judicial campaigns have become increasingly controversial while traditional restraints have fallen to
the wayside. This article will address the variety of election
methods, the challenges that recent constitutional decisions
have presented to the ABA Code of Judicial Conduct, and
whether innovations, such as public financing, offer a solution.

MODERN STATE SCHEMES

Despite the wide variance among states and the fact that no
two states go about judicial selection exactly the same, it’s possible to classify the different methods by general category. The
following summary, largely from the American Bar
Association’s Standing Committee on Judicial Independence
(ABA), considers state high courts, intermediate appellate
courts, and trial courts separately.
STATE HIGH COURTS

Called “supreme courts” in 48 states, these courts typically
represent the highest level of judicial review that a state offers.
According to the ABA, 38 states have some type of judicial
election at this highest level. Six states1 have partisan elections, 15 have nonpartisan elections,2 and 17 have uncontested
retention elections3 after an initial appointment. The remaining 12 states either grant life tenure to judges, or use some
form of reappointment.4 States that appoint judges to an initial term without an election still undertake the process differ-

Footnotes
1. Alabama, Illinois, Louisiana, Pennsylvania, Texas, and West
Virginia. In Illinois and Pennsylvania, judges must first win their
initial term through a contested partisan election. Thereafter, they
run in uncontested retention elections for subsequent terms.
A.B.A. Standing Committee on Judicial Independence, Fact Sheet,
available at http://www.abanet.org/judind/jeopardy/fact/html
(June 7, 2006) [hereinafter Fact Sheet].
2. Arkansas, Georgia, Idaho, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota,
Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota,
Ohio, Oregon, Washington, and Wisconsin. Id.
3. Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Indiana, Iowa,
Kansas, Maryland, Missouri, New England, New Mexico,
Oklahoma, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, and Wyoming all have
uncontested retention elections after an initial appointment. Id.
New Mexico modifies the method by initially appointing judges
who then face a contested partisan election for a full term, and then
run in uncontested retention elections for subsequent terms. Id.
4. Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Massachusetts, Maine, New
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ently. In 23 states, the governor appoints judges to the highest
court with the assistance of a commission.5 In contrast, while
the governor appoints the judges in California, Maine, New
Jersey and New Hampshire, he or she does so without the aid
of any such commission.6 The legislature chooses judges in
both South Carolina and Virginia.7
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURTS

Thirty-nine states have intermediate appellate courts.8
Among those states, 5 choose intermediate appellate judges

5.

6.
7.
8.

Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, Vermont,
Virginia, and South Carolina.
See Larry C. Berkson, Judicial Selection in the United States: A
Special Report, AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y (1999), available at
http://www.ajs.org/js/berkson_2005.pdf, at 6 (last visited June 9,
2006). This method is also used by the District of Columbia, with
the exception that in lieu of a governor, the President of the
United States makes all appointments to the D.C. Court of
Appeals (the highest court) and D.C. Superior Court (trial court).
See Judicial Selection in the States: District of Columbia, available
at http://www.ajs.org/js/DC_methods.htm (lasted visited June 9,
2006).
See Berkson, supra note 5, at 6-7.
Id. at 7.
See Fact Sheet, supra note 1. The states that do not have intermediate appellate courts are Delaware, Maine, Montana, Nevada,
New Hampshire, North Dakota, Rhode Island, South Dakota,
Vermont, West Virginia, and Wyoming.

eral jurisdiction trial courts depending on the county or judicial district. For example, in Indiana, the governor appoints
trial court judges in Lake and St. Joseph counties from lists of
names submitted by local nominating commissions, but the
voting public elects trial judges in other counties.20 Those
elections are partisan except for Allen County, where judges
run without party designation.21 As with other judicial
appointments, the legislature appoints trial judges in both
South Carolina, and Virginia and the governor forgoes the aid
of a nominating commission in Maine, New Hampshire, and
New Jersey.22
EVALUATING THE DIFFERENT METHODS

A preliminary question is whether judges should be elected
or appointed, but additional questions arise depending on that
answer. If judges are elected, should the election be partisan
or nonpartisan? If appointed, what benefits does commission
input provide? Finally, once the initial selection has been

through partisan elections9 and 12 hold nonpartisan elections.10 Of the 22 states that initially appoint judges, 14 states
require that incumbents run in uncontested retention elections,11 while the remaining 8 states either grant life tenure or
use a reappointment method.12 As with state supreme court
appointments, the legislature appoints judges in both South
Carolina and Virginia, and the governor makes his or her
appointments without the aid of a nominating commission in
California and New Jersey.13
Such a commission assists the governors of the remaining
eighteen states when they appoint intermediate appellate
judges.14
TRIAL COURTS OF GENERAL JURISDICTION

Thirty-nine states hold elections of some kind for trial
courts.15 Eight states hold partisan elections for all trial court
judges,16 while 20 states have nonpartisan elections.17 Seven
states appoint trial judges,18 but hold uncontested retention
elections. Four states19 use different selection systems for gen-

9. Alabama, Illinois, Louisiana, Pennsylvania, and Texas.
10. Arkansas, Georgia, Idaho, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota,
Mississippi, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Washington, and
Wisconsin.
11. Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Indiana, Iowa,
Kansas, Missouri, Nebraska, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Tennessee,
and Utah.
12. Connecticut, Hawaii, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New
York, South Carolina, and Virginia.
13. See Berkson, supra note 5, at 7.
14. Id.
15. See Fact Sheet, supra note 1. Eleven states (Connecticut,
Delaware, Hawaii, Massachusetts, Maine, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Vermont, and Virginia)
either grant life tenure or use reappointment of some type for all
general jurisdiction trial courts. Id.
16. Alabama, Illinois, Louisiana, New York, Pennsylvania, Tennessee,
Texas, and West Virginia hold partisan elections. Id.

17. Arkansas, California, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Kentucky,
Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nevada,
North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South
Dakota, Washington, and Wisconsin all hold nonpartisan elections. Id.
18. Alaska, Colorado, Iowa, Nebraska, New Mexico, Utah, and
Wyoming use uncontested retention elections. Id.
19. The types of election vary by county or district in Arizona,
Indiana, Kansas, and Missouri. Id.
20. See Judicial Selection in the States: Indiana, available at
http://www.ajs.org/js/IN_methods.htm (last visited June 9, 2006).
21. Id. In Kansas, the method of selection varies by judicial district
(17 districts select district court judges using a nominating commission, while 14 use partisan elections). See Berkson, supra note
5, at 7. The public elects most Missouri trial court judges in partisan contests, but four counties appoint the judges based on a
commission’s recommendation. Id.
22. See Berkson, supra note 5, at 7.

Court Review 17

made, should the judge be subject to an uncontested retention
election or reappointment, or enjoy a life tenure?
ELECTION OR APPOINTMENT

During the colonial era, the king chose all judges. That pattern survived the Revolution as governors of the newly formed
states continued to appoint state judges in the early years of the
Union.23 Popular election, however, is the essence of a democracy and in 1832, Mississippi became the first state to constitutionally decree the election of judges. Every state that entered
the Union between 1846 and 1912 similarly provided for judicial elections. Supporters of popular election believe that
accountability is of paramount importance and contend that as
policymakers, judges resemble legislators: if judges make policy
decisions, the absence of direct electoral accountability is contrary to democratic principles. Further, some believe that elections increase representation of women and minorities on the
bench.24 Despite these benefits, some critics perceive the election of judges as potentially problematic, charging that such
selection compromises judicial independence.25 Beyond the
obvious problem that campaigning judges might take positions
on issues they will later face on the bench,26 concerns also exist
regarding attorneys who contribute financially to campaigning
judges and then subsequently appear before them in court.
Such a relationship threatens the judge’s required impartiality.
Additionally, voters in some judicial elections—forced to
choose from a seemingly indiscernible pool of candidates without the benefit of traditional campaign rhetoric—may not be
sufficiently informed to make intelligent voting decisions and
may simply decide to not vote.
Supporters of judicial appointment argue that the method
mitigates the problems that come with elections and results in
the selection of judges based on professional qualifications
rather than political success. Advocates believe this approach
de-politicizes the process, but critics contend that the process
is still inherently political and that an appointment process,
often undertaken by a nominating committee or commission,
merely “substitutes committee politics for electoral politics.”27
Interest groups will inevitably promote their interests to the
best of their ability, regardless of the judicial selection mechanism, and so the appointment method succumbs to the same
politicization as an election, but without the accompanying
accountability.

23. See id. at 1.
24. Tanya L. Green, The American Judiciary: Understanding Federal
and State Courts, available at http://www.cwfa.org/articledisplay
.asp?id=7296&department=LEGAL&categoryid=legalother (last
visited June 12, 2006).
25. See e.g., AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY: REPORT OF
THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION COMMISSION ON THE 21ST CENTURY
JUDICIARY, available at http://www.abanet.org/judind/jeopardy/pdf/
report.pdf (last visited June 11, 2006).
26. See Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 US 765 (2002)
(finding that First Amendment speech provisions prohibit states
limiting judicial candidates’ speech).
27. Michael DeBow, Judicial Selection White Papers: The Case for
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PARTISAN OR NONPARTISAN ELECTIONS

On one hand, partisan elections embody the very sort of
political divisiveness cited by critics of judicial elections.
Critics of partisan elections, alleging that such selection affects
the behavior of judges on the bench, cite to the fact that the
average tort award varies dramatically between partisan and
nonpartisan states. According to one study, this is particularly
true for out-of-state defendants, against whom the average tort
award is $276,320 in nonpartisan states compared to an eyebrow-raising $652,720 in partisan states.28 On the other hand,
partisan elections provide the voter a quick and generally accurate way of distinguishing candidates who may be otherwise
fungible to the average, nonlawyer voter.
Returning to the theme of accountability to voters, supporters of partisan elections argue that “[a]ccountability requires
institutional arrangements that strengthen voters’ ability to
select officials who will . . . govern consistently with the majority’s policy preferences.”29 While voters may not be able to
readily evaluate different judges’ judicial philosophies and
qualifications, they are able to choose between a Republican or
Democrat and the corresponding policy stances.
THE BENEFIT OF COMMISSION INPUT

The vast majority of state governors who appoint judges do
so with the assistance of a commission. Under this method, a
commission actively locates, recruits, investigates, and evaluates potential judges. At the conclusion of this process, that
commission advances a list of names to the governor, who
makes a final selection. This process, favored by the American
Bar Association, the American Judicature Society, and others,
endeavors to choose applicants on the basis of their qualifications rather than political or social connections. Furthermore,
this approach recognizes that a single governor, acting alone,
often lacks the time, resources, or possibly even knowledge to
parse out the best qualified potential judges from a crowded
legal field.
UNCONTESTED RETENTION ELECTIONS,
REAPPOINTMENT OR LIFE TENURE

States first implemented retention elections to provide for
public participation in the selection process while still excluding partisan politics, believing that the elimination of party
labels and campaigns would help voters focus on the record
and professional qualifications of sitting judges.30 Unless

Partisan Elections, Federalist Society for Law and Public Policy
Studies, available at http://www.fed-soc.org/Publications/
White%20Papers/judicialelection.htm (last visited June 12, 2006)
[hereinafter DeBow].
28. Alexander Tabarrok and Erik A. Helland, Partisan Judicial
Elections and Home Court Advantage, CORPORATE LEGAL TIMES,
available at http://www.independent.org/newsroom/article
.asp?id=225 (last visited June 12, 2006).
29. DeBow, supra note 27, at 7-8.
30. Kevin M. Esterline, Judicial Accountability the Right Way, 82
JUDICATURE 206 (1999); William K. Hall & Larry T. Aspin, The
Roll-off Effect in Judicial Retention Elections, 24 SOC. SCI. J. 415, 418
(1987).

given a strong reason to do otherwise, voters generally have
supported the judges in such elections: from 1964 to 1998—
only 52 of 4,588 judges running in retention elections lost.31
In this regard, the system has proven effective as a means for
the voting public to hold judges accountable. Implicit in this
accountability, however, some critics have found the potential
for abuse by interest groups. Any judge who strikes down a
popular law, renders an arguably lenient sentence, or otherwise
makes an unpopular decision may, in doing so, imperil his or
her reelection. For example, after the Florida Supreme Court
in 1990 struck down a state law requiring minor girls to obtain
parental consent before obtaining abortions, the Florida Right
to Life Committee unsuccessfully sought to defeat Chief
Justice Leander Shaw.32 The result of such action is awareness
on the part of judges that while they are ostensibly independent, an unpopular decision might prove fatal to their return
to the bench. Such an awareness, some may argue, inevitably
politicizes the judges’ decision making. While reappointments
and life tenures may cure this problem of politicized decision
making, such approaches also deprive the public of accountability on the part of the judiciary.

Since 1924 the American Bar Association has produced
ethics guidelines for judges. Originally called “Canons,” subsequent revisions in 1972 and 1990 have renamed the document the Model Code of Judicial Conduct (“Model Code”).33
Each state judiciary and the federal judiciary (except the
Supreme Court of the United States) uses the Model Code as a
starting point for its own ethics rules. Since 2003, a joint commission of the ABA has reviewed the current Model Code in an
effort to update and improve the guidance to judges.34 While
the joint commission intended to conclude its work by the
summer of 2006, it was unable to do so. Among the key reasons for its inability to finish in the allotted time was the
increasing difficulty in applying the current Canon 5 of the
current Model Code, which pertains to conduct by judges and
candidates in the course of election campaigns and judicial
selection processes.
Canon 5 seeks to regulate the behavior of judicial candidates. This is both a practical and constitutional challenge. In
light of the variety of election/selection processes noted above,

it is difficult to draft the Model Code to adapt to all such variations. It is therefore not surprising that Canon 5 is the canon
most revised by state jurisdictions when they form their own
ethics code. Canon 5 in general mandates that “[a] judge or
judicial candidate shall refrain from inappropriate political
activity.”35 The tricky part is determining what constitutes
“inappropriate activity.” In general, for example, judges and
candidates are warned not to act as leaders or officeholders in
political organizations, publicly endorse or oppose candidates
for public office, attend political gatherings, or solicit campaign contributions.
Regardless of whether a state adopts any of the specific proscriptions, there is increasing uncertainty about the constitutionality of some of the provisions. The uncertainty began
with the 2002 decision of the Supreme Court of the United
States in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White.36 The White
decision struck down a provision of Minnesota’s then version
of Canon 5. The clause prohibited judicial candidates from
announcing their views “on disputed legal or political issues.”
This “announce clause” appeared in the 1972 version of the
Model Code but had been removed from the current 1990 version. The Supreme Court held that the announce clause violated the First Amendment rights of candidates, and remanded
the case to the court of appeals for further consideration of
other Minnesota provisions. Subsequently, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit held that other Canon 5
clauses, like the announce clause, also were unconstitutional.37
Specifically, the Eighth Circuit struck down provisions that
prohibited candidates from identifying themselves as members
of a political organization, attending political gatherings, using
endorsements from political organizations, and personally
soliciting contributions. The Supreme Court, notwithstanding
an amicus brief from the ABA begging for review,38 denied a
petition for certiorari.39
In addition to the Minnesota decisions, federal courts also
have been asked to enjoin another provision of Canon 5,
specifically the so-called commit clause. This provision provides that judges and candidates shall not “with respect to
cases, controversies, or issues that are likely to come before the
court, make pledges, promises or commitments that are inconsistent with the impartial performance of the adjudicative
duties of the office.” 40 District courts in Kentucky,41 North

31. Larry T. Aspin, Trends in Judicial Retention Elections, 1964-1998,
83 JUDICATURE 79 (1999).
32. G. Alan Tarr, State Judicial Selection and Independence, in JUSTICE IN
JEOPARDY, supra note 25, at appendix D-8.
33. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Preface (2004), available at
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mcjc/toc.html [hereinafter MODEL
CODE].
34. See ABA Joint Commission to Evaluate the Model Code of Judicial
Conduct, http://www.abanet.org/judicialethics/home.html (last
visited June 21, 2006).
35. MODEL CODE Canon 5 (2004)
36. Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 US 765 (2002). See
also Jan Witold Baran, Judicial Candidate Speech After Republican

Party of Minnesota v. White, COURT REVIEW, Spring 2002, at 12; Roy
A. Schotland, Should Judges Be More Like Politicians?, COURT
REVIEW, Spring 2002, at 8.
37. Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 416 F.3d 738 (8th Cir.
2005).
38. See Brief for American Bar Association, as Amici Curiae, Dimick v.
Republican Party, No. 05-566, available at http://www.abanet.org/
amicus/briefs/holton06.pdf
39. Dimick v. Republican Party, 126 S. Ct. 1165 (2006).
40. MODEL CODE Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(i)(2004).
41. Ackerson v. Ky. Judicial Ret. and Removal Comm’n, 776 F. Supp.
309 (W.D. Ky. 1991) (as applied to administrative matters,
“pledge” and “commit” clauses fail strict scrutiny).
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Dakota,42 and Kansas43 have enjoined this clause in the respective state judicial codes on the grounds that it is too vague and
impinges on First Amendment rights. Moreover, lawsuits have
been filed in various states, including Alabama,44 Kentucky,45
and Pennsylvania,46 challenging provisions that bar judicial
candidates from answering questionnaires from organizations.
Finally, recent controversies have arisen regarding the interpretation of the clause47 that prohibits judges from endorsing
candidates. In Texas the judicial disciplinary committee has
proposed to sanction a state supreme court justice who made
public statements in support of his former colleague, Harriet
Miers, who in the fall of 2005 was nominated by President
George Bush for the United States Supreme Court.48 The statements were interpreted as improper “endorsements” under
Canon 5. The Texas justice has vowed to challenge the sanction as a violation of his First Amendment speech rights. In
addition, several judges on the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit appeared as witnesses before the Senate
Judiciary Committee in support of the nomination of their
then-colleague, Judge Samuel Alito, who also was then a nominee to the Supreme Court of the United States.49 While to
date there is no indication of disciplinary proceedings against
the judges, public reports quoted ethics experts on the issue of
whether the judges’ statements were improper endorsements
under the Code of Conduct for United States Judges, which
warns judges not to “publicly endorse or oppose a candidate
for public office.”50
In short, multiple provisions of Canon 5 are under both
practical and legal challenges. This makes campaigning for
judicial office more complicated and makes the job of the ABA
in rewriting the Model Code a daunting task.
PUBLIC FINANCING OF JUDICIAL CAMPAIGNS

Amid all the challenges and uncertainties surrounding judicial campaigns, there is a faint glimmer of positive change.
North Carolina, subsequent to a proposal by the ABA and its

42. N.D. Family Alliance, Inc. v. Bader, 361 F. Supp. 2d. 1021 (D.N.D.
2005) (“pledge” and “commit” clauses fail strict scrutiny).
43. Kansas Judicial Watch v. Stout, ___ F. Supp. 2d ____, 2006 WL
2038045, 2006 U.S. Dist. Lexis 50765 (D. Kan. July 19, 2006)
(granting preliminary injunction against enforcement of “pledge”
and “commit” clauses as well as prohibition on solicitation of support).
44. Pittman v. Cole, 117 F. Supp. 2d 1285 (S.D. Ala. 2000) (enjoining
ban on answering voter guide), vacated and remanded, 267 F.3d
1269 (11th Cir. 2001) (reversing for want of ripeness).
45. Family Trust Foundation of Ky. v. Wolnitzek, 345 F. Supp. 2d 672
(E.D. Ky. 2004) (“pledge” and “commit” clauses are overbroad
because they cover more than promises to rule in a particular way
on an issue likely to come before court), stay denied sub nom.
Family Trust Foundation of Ky. v. Ky. Judicial Conduct Comm’n,
388 F.3d 224 (6th Cir. 2004).
46. Pa. Family Inst. v. Black, 2005 U.S. Dist. Lexis 29735 (M.D. Pa.
2005) (dismissing for lack of ripeness).
47. MODEL CODE Canon 5(B).
48. See Pete Slover, Panel Rebukes Justice, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, May
24, 2006, available at http://www.dallasnews.com/haredcontent/
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Commission on Public Financing of Judicial Campaigns,51
adopted a public funding system for appellate candidates.52
One of the most nettlesome ethics issues in judicial campaigns
is the manner in which they are funded. Like all other political campaigns, those of judges are increasingly expensive.
Unlike other major statewide campaigns, campaigns for offices
like a state supreme court do not have a large or diverse potential private fundraising base. Contributions to judicial candidates unsurprisingly most often come from members of the bar
or private parties with interests before the courts. Not only is
this source of funding a potential special interest, it usually is
not large enough to provide sufficient resources for expensive
campaigns. For these reasons, the ABA has encouraged states
to consider providing public funding to provide financial
resources and dilute the dependence on private funding.
Public funding of judicial campaigns had been adopted in
Wisconsin in the 1970s. However, it has never been sufficiently funded. North Carolina, in contrast, adopted and
funded a public financing system. The program provides for
threshold eligibility requirements and potential maximum
public funding of slightly over $200,000. Additional public
funds are available under certain conditions.
In 2004, 12 out of 16 eligible candidates qualified for public funding. Out of five seats up for election, two of which
were for the state supreme court, four seats were won by candidates who participated in the public financing program.
Almost $1.5 million was distributed to the 12 participating
candidates, and the public subsidy accounted for 64% of all
money received by Supreme Court candidates.53
These are encouraging statistics. They reflect widespread
candidate participation. Apparently the combination of public
and private funding was sufficient to undertake statewide campaigns. Most important, private funding was a minority source
of funding for the Supreme Court candidates. The challenge
for North Carolina will be to continue providing sufficient
public funds and to maintain a system that provides enough

dws/news/texassouthwest/stories/052406dntexhecht.15a0c2da.ht
ml (last visited June 21, 2006).
49. See U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, “Supreme Court
Witness List for Thursday, January 12, 2006 at 9:30 a.m.,” available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearing.cfm?id=1725 (noting
the scheduled appearances of Judges Becker, Scirica, Barry,
Aldisert, and Garth).
50. JUDICIARY POLICIES AND PROCEDURES: CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED
STATES JUDGES Canon 7(A)(2).
51. ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, REPORT OF
THE COMMISSION ON PUBLIC FINANCING OF JUDICIAL CAMPAIGNS 30-57
(2002), available at http://www.soros.org/initiatives/justice/articles_publications/publications/judcampaigns_20020201/commissionreport.pdf (last visited June 22, 2006).
52. See NORTH CAROLINA JUDICIAL CAMPAIGN REFORM ACT, S.B. 1054
(2002), available at http://www.ncjudges.org/citizens/education/
about_jcra/full_text.php (last visited June 22, 2006).
53. JUSTICE AT STAKE, THE NEW POLITICS OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 38-39
(2004), available at http://www.justiceatstake.org/iles/New
PoliticsReport2004.pdf (last visited June 22, 2006).

Seizing the
Accountability Moment:
Enlisting Americans in the Fight to Keep Courts
Fair, Impartial, and Independent
Bert Brandenburg

id the 2005 uproar over Terri Schiavo’s end-of-life case
mark a peak in the recent surge of attacks on the independence of America’s courts? When the case generated threats to impeach and even murder the presiding judge,
and Congress passed a bill seeking to manipulate the case,
broad public disapproval helped end the political crisis.1 The
President backpedaled—“I believe in an independent judiciary.
I believe in checks and balances”2—and dispatched the Vice
President and Attorney General to add their reassurances. Just
a few months later, Supreme Court nomination hearings
offered little hint of the rising tide of fury that courts and
judges have been facing during the past decade.
Although American history shows that hostility to the
courts sometimes rises and falls in cycles, it’s unlikely that the
current round will subside anytime soon. A generation of
opportunistic politicians and special interest groups have nurtured a litany of grievances against the judiciary, aggressively
stereotyping judges as enemies of mainstream values.3 2005
marked the national coming of age for an outrage industry that
stokes anger over controversial decisions and paints judges as
“tyrants in black robes” in order to raise money, turn out voters, intimidate and even impeach judges, and roll back the
power of the courts to protect people’s rights. The Schiavo
fight was just one battle in a war that fits perfectly into the
polarized politics and 24-hour media circus that is early 21stcentury America. Court-bashing won’t be fading away any
time soon.
How can supporters reclaim the debate and shore up public

D

support for the independence of the courts in the face of this
onslaught? This article reviews the results of a major public
opinion research project exploring the attitudes of Americans
toward the growing tide of attacks on the courts. It suggests
that Americans of all backgrounds are ready to reject the sloganeering and stand up for strong courts—if their defenders
embrace both independence and accountability, and link the
work of the courts to the values Americans care about most. It
outlines a simple and powerful communications framework
for defending courts from political interference, putting courtbashers on the defensive, and exposing radical attacks for what
they are.
Above all, the research suggests that for America’s courts,
the road to independence goes through accountability.
Accountability is not the only principle of an effective communications framework. But court-bashers have been abusing the definition of accountability for years, exploiting the
reticence of judges and bar leaders who worry that judicial
accountability is too complicated, weak, or unique a concept
to defend in a public debate. If courts and those who care
about them can learn to make accountability their friend and
define judicial accountability properly before the other side
corrupts it, they’ll go a long way toward turning back the
onslaught of attacks on the independence and impartiality of
our courts.
The Justice at Stake Campaign4 commissioned the opinion
research firm of Belden, Russonello & Stewart to design and
conduct a two-phase research project, including focus groups

This article is based in part on findings available in a Justice at Stake
monograph, Speak to American Values: A Handbook for Winning the
Debate for Fair and Impartial Courts, available at http://www.justiceatstake.org/files/SpeaktoAmericasValues2.pdf.

3. At the state level, a Justice at Stake search using Nexis revealed 27
news stories in 1998-2001 about calls for impeachment of state
judges. In a comparable period, 2002-05, that number spiked to
45. At the federal level, in 1997 Congressman Tom DeLay said
that he had a list of judges who violated their oaths of office and
should be impeached. He said that judges “need to be intimidated” into upholding the Constitution. In 2003, he launched the
House Working Group on Judicial Accountability, stating, “We in
the House are putting America’s judges on alert. We are watching
you.” In 2005, the chief of staff to Oklahoma Senator Tom
Coburn, told a conference that, “I don’t want to impeach judges. I
want to impale them!”
4. Justice at Stake is a nonpartisan national partnership working to
The views
keep courts fair, impartial, and independent.
expressed here do not necessarily reflect the opinions of Justice at
Stake partner organizations.

Footnotes
1. By a margin of 70%-27%, Americans called it “not appropriate for
Congress to get involved” by passing a law requiring the federal
courts to review the Schiavo case. Federal Intervention in Schiavo
Case Prompts Broad Public Disapproval, Mar. 21, 2005 available at
http://abcnews.go.com/images/Politics/978a1Schiavo.pdf.
2. David D. Kirkpatrick, After DeLay Remarks, Bush Says He Supports
“Independent Judiciary,” N.Y. Times, Apr. 9, 2005 available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/04/09/politics/09judges.html?ex=1
270699200&en=ae896f7768d67eee&ei=5088&partner=rssnyt.
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and a national survey.5 Survey respondents were queried about
their confidence in major institutions (including the courts),
their knowledge of how courts work, and the values they want
ns of
to uphold. After an initial test of their willingness
their courts33%
ights
to support stronger congressional checks on federal courts,
they were asked to consider a variety of mechanisms to impleartial
ment such31%
checks, including jurisdiction-stripping legislation
and impeachment. They were asked to consider whether the
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power
13% of the courts should be curbed with respect to high-proolitics
file issues like gay marriage and the public display of the Ten
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to common arguments made for and against curbing the power
Question: In your opinion, which ONE
of the courts.
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on both
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for the court system in the US to have?
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versies involving state courts, and that indeed Americans do
not often distinguish between the two).
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the American
public continues to
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100%
hold
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but
soft
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about
the
courts and that the
Survey by Belden Russonello & Stewart for Justice at Stake, July 2005 (N=1,286; margin of error 2.8%).
public’s knowledge of the courts remains rudimentary. As an
institution, the courts enjoy more of the public’s confidence
than does Congress. The Supreme Court receives the strongest
vote of confidence (30% “great deal”; 46% “some” confidence)
followed by federal courts (23%; 51%) and state courts (20%;
51%). Even individual judges (20%; 55%) garner more public
confidence than Congress (12%; 52%).
THE IMPORTANCE OF KNOWLEDGE AND EDUCATION
The survey
33% revealed how critical it is to educate more
AmericansAccountable
on how courtstowork. Less than half know that fedthe
Congress
eral judges serve
life terms, and bare majorities know that fed-

eral judges are appointed or can identify the three branches of
Don’t
the government. But
the news is not all bleak: most
6% Know
Americans generally understand the Constitutional role of the
courts62%
and the opportunity for appealing court rulings, and
that judges
are bound
Accountable
toby precedent in their decisions.
Most
the research confirmed a direct correlathesignificantly,
Constitution
tion between knowledge about the courts and willingness to
support them in the face of attacks. Those Americans with the
most knowledge of how courts function tend to be among the
n: With whom most
do you agree
more,
whoattempts
say:
likely
to those
reject
to reduce their powers. Having
he job of Congress to hold the courts accountable and reduce abuses by judges, or
an understanding of the role of precedent, appeals, constitues should be accountable to the law and the Constitution and not to Congress?
tional review, and other aspects of the courts appears to reinvey by Belden Russonello & Stewart for Justice at Stake, July 2005 (N=1,286; margin of error 2.8%).
force an appreciation for the courts and their role as constitutional guardian. Educating Americans about the courts isn’t
just good civics—it’s smart politics as well.
General education levels are also important. A regression
analysis of the results shows that the strongest predictor of
opposition to or support for congressional checks is education
level. As the opinion research firm observed:

5. In phase one, six focus groups were held in Spring 2005—in
Raleigh, NC, Chicago, IL, and Columbus, OH—with voters who
had at least some college education and who demonstrated some
level of community or political involvement. A national telephone survey of 1,286 adults living in the U.S. was conducted
from July 20 to July 30, 2005. The data have been weighted by

MOST IMPORTANT QUALITY FOR THE COURT SYSTEM

One story line is that the two most reliable
predictors of a person’s views on most social
issues—political party affiliation and political ideology identification—give way to education when it comes to the courts. A highly
educated person, whether that person is a
Democrat or Republican, liberal or conservative, is more likely to be a core supporter of
the courts, while a person with very little
education is likely to be a court critic, regardless of other characteristics.
This finding has important implications for targeting.
Court defenders should make it a priority to reach well-educated audiences and mobilize them to resist radical attacks on
the courts.
Conversely, the greatest challenge will be to inform and
engage Americans who have less education. This poll, and
others conducted in recent years, suggest an additional complication: when lesser-educated Americans happen to be racial
and ethnic minorities, their disaffection with the courts may
well be based on factors that have little to do with ideological
attacks on the courts. In a 2001-02 poll commissioned by
Justice at Stake, 62% of voters, including nearly 90 percent of
African-American voters, feel that “there are two systems of
justice in the U.S. – one for the rich and powerful and one for
everyone else.”6 This is consistent with other polling, which
shows that people of color are generally less satisfied and more

race and age to bring them into proper proportions with the U.S.
adult population. The margin of sampling error is 2.8 percentage
points for the entire survey.
6. See Speak to American Values: A Handbook for Winning the Debate
for Fair and Impartial Courts, available at http://www.justiceat
stake.org/files/PollingsummaryFINAL.pdf.
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cynical about the performance of the judicial system. While
minority attitudes toward the courts are beyond the scope of
this article, more work needs to be done to make judicial independence issues relevant to communities of color.
A BATTLE OVER VALUES

The research also uncovered evidence of a real battle over
values, a contest far more sophisticated than talk-show shouting matches over slogans like “judicial activism.” Indeed, one
of the most encouraging pieces of news coming out of the
research is that the core values that Americans want from their
courts—fairness, responsibility, and protection of rights—
require that the judiciary be independent from special-interest
pressure. More specifically, in focus groups and on the survey,
Americans consistently articulated these values in four ways:7
• A strong belief in the courts’ role in protecting individual
rights by upholding the Constitution;
• The priority of guaranteeing access to justice for all
Americans;
• Desire for the courts to be fair and impartial, which means
free from political influence or pressure once on the bench;
and
• The need for accountability to ensure judges follow the law
and Constitution and not their own personal beliefs.
Conversely, those who would like to weaken the role of the
courts make headway when they are able to assert—unanswered—that judges are violating these values, either by ruling
according to their own personal views or because they are not
free from political influence. The challenge for court advocates is to show how courts honor the values Americans expect
from them, and to show how their opponents would undermine those core beliefs. By focusing on these core values—
and not becoming mired in debates over individual rulings,
controversial issues of the day or slogans such as “judicial
activism”—defenders of strong checks and balances can present a stronger case than those who would undermine them.
Indeed, supporters of independent courts may be heartened
to know that the research shows that charges of “judicial
activism,” as ubiquitous as they may seem, have little effect on
the attitudes of most Americans. It’s a mistake to be obsessed
about such charges or to be drawn into debates over the definition of activism. The charge of “judicial activism” does have
a galvanizing effect on people who are already antagonistic to
the judiciary but it doesn’t tend to win new converts to the
cause of weakening the courts. Similarly, defenders of strong
courts should avoid being pulled into debates over the merits
of controversial decisions or the hot-button issues that underlie them, like abortion, public display of the Ten
Commandments, and marriage. When discussions focus on
cases and controversies, it’s easier to lose sight of the role that
Americans want courts to play in a constitutional system.

7. Id.
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WHO SUPPORTS THE COURT, WHO DOESN’T, AND
WHO’S READY TO LISTEN?

The research found that many respondents fell into one of
three categories:8
Core supporters: People who were most likely to support maintaining the power of the courts without hearing any information. A majority within each of the
groups listed below opposed increased congressional
checks when initially asked, and almost three in ten
strongly disagree with increased checks:
• People with college education or more
• People earning $75,000 per year or more
• People who rarely or never attend religious services
• People who are knowledgeable about the courts
Most persuadable: People who are more likely to support the courts after being exposed to the arguments on
both sides. By the end of the survey, a majority in each
of these groups opposes increased congressional checks:
• Men over 40 years old
• Older baby boomers (between 50 and 59 years old)
• Liberals
• Independents
• Northeasterners
• Suburbanites
Court skeptics: Those least likely to support the courts
after being exposed to arguments on their behalf:
• Black Americans
• Hispanics
• Less educated
• Lower income
• Less knowledgeable about the courts
It’s telling that this last list does not include self-identified
conservative frequent church attendees. While most people in
this group initially express strong support for weakening the
courts, many soften their position after hearing messages for
and against congressional checks. After hearing both sides of
the argument, the percentage saying they strongly agree with
increased congressional checks drops 11 points (39% to 28%).
The pro-courts messages that resonate with this segment
remind them of the important role the courts serve as
guardians of the Constitution and individual rights, and in
providing access to justice for all.
TESTING CHECKS ON THE COURTS

Since congressional attempts to limit the power of the
courts have been in the news in recent years, the survey provided a useful opportunity to test Americans’ reactions to such
efforts. As a general matter, they value accountability very
strongly: 81% want more accountability from the courts. “I
feel anyone who is held accountable will probably do a better
job,” said one focus-group participant. So it’s not surprising

8. Id.

SHOULD COURTS BE ACCOUNTABLE TO
POLITICIANS OR THE CONSTITUTION?

whether any of the following were excellent reasons to support
such checks, respondents picked:
“Too many activist judges are reinterpreting the
Constitution to fit their personal views.” (29% called
it an “excellent” reason to support more checks)
“When judges start changing the definition of marriage by allowing gay couples to marry, it is time for
Congress to step in and check the courts.” (29%)
“Too many judges are making decisions that are out
of ‘mainstream America’ like banning displays of the
Ten Commandments, and it is time for Congress to
step in and check the courts.” (28%)
“Too many judges are legislating from the bench
and making laws instead of interpreting the laws.”
(28%)
“Judges who are unaccountable to voters should
not be allowed to make decisions that run counter to
Americans’ beliefs.” (22%)

that when respondents were asked at the outset of the poll,
before hearing any arguments on either side, whether more
checks on the power of the courts and judges were needed,
they agreed by a margin of 54%-40%.9
Those who would limit the courts felt more strongly about
their position than those who opposed them (31% strongly
favored limits, 20% strongly opposed them). Initial support
for increased congressional power was strongest among less
educated people (37% strongly agreed), frequent churchgoers
(36%), conservative frequent churchgoers (39%) and
Southerners (38%). Partisan affiliation had little effect:
Democrats (30% strongly agreed) and Republicans (32%) both
initially leaned in favor of increased checks, as did moderates
(28%), and independents (31%). Liberals were split on the
issue (28% strongly agree, 26% strongly disagree). As might be
expected, regression analysis shows that the strongest predictor of opposition to or support for congressional checks is education level.
In isolation, these findings could spell more trouble for the
courts. But when Americans weigh the other values they want
from the courts, and the specific remedies being proposed to
make courts more accountable, they grow wary of attempts to
curb their powers. For example, when asked to consider a
variety of competing values, only 16% of respondents thought
that the most important quality they wanted from courts was
to be either “accountable for their decisions” or “responsive to
society’s concerns”— compared to 77% who chose “fair and
impartial,” “independent from politics,” or “guardians of
Constitutional rights.”
These findings were reinforced by an additional question
series that tested how Americans react to common messages
advanced on both sides of the debate over whether Congress
should impose more checks on the courts.
When asked

On the other hand, when asked whether any of the following were excellent reasons to oppose such checks, respondents
picked:
“We need strong courts to protect our rights under
the Constitution and the Bill of Rights.” (61% called it
an “excellent” reason to oppose such checks)
“We need strong courts to ensure access to justice/a
day in court for all Americans.” (56%)
“We need strong courts to protect us from abusive
actions by government/law enforcement.” (46%)
“Strong courts are necessary to balance the power of
the Congress and President and it would be a mistake
to upset this balance.” (43%)
“The courts are part of our democracy that has
worked well for hundreds of years and we should not
weaken it now.” (41%)
“Strong courts are a necessary check on extreme
politicians.” (39%)
“We need strong courts as a check on the will of the
majority, because the majority at any given time may
want to pass laws that threaten the rights of individuals.” (35%)
The comparison is striking—every single message in opposition to more checks on the courts, even the weakest, bested every
single message in support of more checks on the courts, even the
strongest. Indeed, after hearing messages from both sides of the
debate, public support drops for the general idea of increased
congressional checks on the courts. Overall support for the
idea decreases five points from 54% to 49% and opposition to
Congress as enforcers of judicial accountability rises five
points from 40% to 45%.
Certain groups were more likely than others to curb their
enthusiasm for congressional checks after hearing both sides,

9. Id.
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including women, westerners, Democrats and moderates.
Indeed, by the end of the survey, a majority of the following
groups opposed increased congressional checks:
•
•
•
•
•
•

Men over age 40 (57% disagree)
People between 50 and 59 years old (54%)
Liberals (55%)
Independents (51%)
Suburbanites (56%)
Northeasterners (53%).

Conservative frequent church attenders softened their position after hearing messages for and against congressional
checks. Their overall support for congressional checks
dropped two points, but the percent saying they strongly agree
with increased congressional checks drops 11 points (39% to
28%). Like other Americans, they are moved by messages that
remind them of the important roles the courts serve as
guardians of the Constitution and individual rights and in providing access to justice for all.
Americans were also asked to evaluate four ways that
Congress could reduce the power of the courts. In every
instance, they expressed less support for specific checks than
they had for the general concept of increased checks. They
clearly opposed stripping jurisdiction from the courts to hear
certain kinds of cases (53% to 39%) and threatening judges
with impeachment over an unpopular decision (63% to 32%).
Indeed, a majority (53%) believes that if Congress “threatens
judges with impeachment” based on their rulings “it will result
in political intimidation” and “prevent the courts from being
fair and impartial.” However, they leaned in favor of summoning a judge to hearings before Congress to answer questions
(51% to 40%) or even threatening impeachment over a series of
decisions that many people disagree with (51% to 42%). In
each instance, higher support for checks was expressed by
racial minorities, people with less knowledge of how courts
work, those with less education, and people earning less money.
THE IMPORTANCE OF ACCOUNTABILITY

One of the most important lessons of this research project
involves the concept of judicial accountability, which is popular among all segments of the population. Supporters of
strong courts can’t afford to ignore it. Indeed, court-bashers
have made accountability a staple of their message, seeking to
portray judicial independence and its defenders as the enemies
of America’s mainstream values and populist heritage.
Of course, since courts must protect rights and offer impartial justice, judicial accountability is different than for executives and legislators. That’s one of the reasons that judges, bar
leaders, and other defenders of the courts ignore the topic, or
grow almost apologetic when it is brought up. Courts are different, they say. That’s true, but such responses come across as
dismissive of accountability and plays into the court-bashers’
trap. Americans feel strongly that courts have to be accountable, and they will reject any message to the contrary. This
strong public belief in accountability—and the fact that
Americans simultaneously demand a sophisticated blend of
values from their courts—has powerful implications for the
current national debate.
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The crux of the question is this: to whom should courts be
accountable? When this question was posed, Americans were
decisive in rejecting accountability that smacked of political
interference in their courts of law. More specifically, large
majorities of Americans believe the courts should be accountable to the Constitution and law (62%) rather than Congress
(33%). A plurality (42%) believes it strongly. Few demographic characteristics divide the population on this matter,
and even among those groups giving congressional checks the
strongest support, the percentage on the side of the law and
Constitution is near 60 percent. Defenders of strong courts
would do well to embrace accountability—to the Constitution
and the Bill of Rights, not to politicians and special interests.
They should remind Americans that court decisions must be
published, and that they can be appealed to higher courts.
This finding is consistent with other parts of the research.
As one focus group participant, a self-described moderate, put
it: “Representatives are only in office for a short period of
time, and the Constitution has been around for hundreds of
years. So let’s go with something that has been there for a while
instead of someone who just got into office.” In the survey, by
a margin of 94% to 5%, respondents agreed that, “We need
strong courts that are free from political influence.” This finding is reinforced by Americans’ revulsion at congressional meddling in the Terri Schiavo case.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Americans are ready to reject political interference with our
courts—if defenders of the courts use the right language to
make their case. The research findings can be boiled down to
five recommendations:
Stick to the core message: In order to protect access to
justice for all and our rights under the Constitution,
we must defend fair and impartial courts from political
interference.
Speak to American values: Connect with a bipartisan
majority of Americans by talking about the role of the
courts in protecting individual rights and ensuring
everyone a day in court.
Describe the threat: Americans grow concerned when
they hear about political interference with the courts,
but they need to be educated about those threats.
Embrace accountability: People want courts to be
accountable—but to the Constitution and the law, not
to politicians and special-interest groups.
Don’t be distracted: Don’t get trapped debating controversial decisions or slogans like “judicial activism.”
If more bench, bar, and civic leaders are willing to speak to
American values, and invoke time-tested principles, they can
help check the “outrage industry” that hopes to wage a permanent campaign against the courts.
But the findings also suggest implications that go well
beyond communications frameworks and today’s debates. It’s
fair to say that the long-term health of the courts is dependent
on Americans’ civic education generally and knowledge of the
courts in particular. Here, too, there are encouraging signs; in
the wake of growing concern about the state of civics educa-

long-term investments in education designed to protect our
system of checks and balances.
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tion in the schools, a growing number of states are reexamining their educational standards and considering strategies for
improvement. Last year, the American Bar Association created a Commission on Civic Education and the Separation of
Powers, co-chaired by former Supreme Court Justice Sandra
Day O’Connor and former U.S. Senator Bill Bradley, to boost
education on the separation of powers, with a particular
emphasis on the role of an independent judiciary. One of the
commission’s tasks is to review current curricula on separation
of powers in U.S. civics, government, and history classrooms
in order to recommend improvements and model programs.
Increased education outside the classroom will also be
critical: in the mass media, in small gatherings, and everywhere in between. Many courts and bar associations work
hard to educate the public. They would do well to increase
these efforts wherever possible, and to view them as part of a
permanent campaign, not a short-term fad. The fact is, those
who would tear down the courts have been fighting for a generation. They are committed to a long-term plan to make
courts less fair, impartial, and independent. Defenders of the
courts need to look beyond the Schiavo battle, and commit to
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Judges, Law, Politics & Strategy
Frank B. Cross

I

n law, we commonly presume that judges reach decisions
based on legal materials, such as precedents. In political science, researchers typically presume that judges do not reach
decisions based on such legal materials. They maintain that the
apparent reliance on precedent to reach decisions is simply a
hoax designed to provide cover for a particular outcome. These
researchers traditionally argued that judges reach their personally preferred outcome in the case and then rationalize it after the
fact with references to precedent, conveniently supplied them by
the attorneys for their preferred side.
Much of the empirical research on judicial decision making
has involved the United States Supreme Court. Indeed, there is
considerable evidence that Supreme Court justices decide cases
differently, for ideological reasons, and do not reliably defer to
prior precedents of the Court. For structural reasons, though,
the Supreme Court is not a representative sample to study the
operation of the law. The Court selects its own cases, and very
few of them. These are often the cases where the law does not
provide a clear answer, so one cannot look for legal control.
Moreover, in its position at the top of the judicial hierarchy, the
Supreme Court has no vertically superior precedents it is legally
bound to obey.
The lower courts are where the law is found in this nation.
They issue vastly more decisions and the appellate courts are
often the final arbiters of legal disputes, on the frequent occasions when the Supreme Court does not review their rulings.
Political scientists and economists have considered the role of
precedent in lower courts. Although loath to accept claims that
judges follow precedent because they are supposed to do so,
these researchers have argued that lower-court judges do indeed
follow precedent, for strategic reasons.
STRATEGY THEORY OF PRECEDENT FOLLOWING

The basic premise of the strategic theory of following precedents is that lower-court judges do not reach their preferred outcomes in cases because of a fear of reversal by a higher court.
They compromise their ideological preferences to avoid a reversal, which would of course undo those preferences. In addition,
researchers hypothesize that there is some stigma associated with
reversal such that judges will shun results that subject them to
higher-court reversal.
At the federal-circuit-court level, this hypothesis has facial
plausibility problems. The federal circuit courts decide tens of
thousands of cases annually, while the Supreme Court now
reviews fewer than one hundred cases. If judges are so devoted
to their ideological preferences, it makes little sense for them to
sacrifice those preferences across the board, when the probability of reversal is so extremely low.
The experience of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals illustrates this effect. In 1997, the Supreme Court took 29 cases from
the Ninth Circuit and reversed 96% of them, which probably
represents a record for the disciplining of a particular circuit
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court. Yet the Ninth Circuit decided around eight thousand
cases a year, and the Supreme Court let stand 99.7% of the circuit’s 1997 decisions. Thus, the circuit had little incentive to
modify its decisions to avoid reversal and in fact it did not do so.
The Ninth Circuit continued to have a high reversal rate at the
Court, typically rendering relatively liberal decisions, a few of
which were reversed but most of which stood unreviewed.
Researchers have come up with some clever theories of random auditing that enable the Supreme Court to have influence
beyond the few cases it takes. But none of these theories enable
a Court deciding so few cases to exercise control over the vast
body of circuit court decision making. Moreover, these strategic
theories do not truly explain adherence to precedent – they try
to explain adherence to contemporaneous Supreme Court preferences. Under the theories, there is little reason for a circuit
court to follow a Warren Court precedent, when such an outcome may not be favored by the present makeup of the Supreme
Court.
This adherence to current Supreme Court preferences is
sometimes called “anticipatory overruling.” This occurs when a
lower court believes that the Supreme Court wishes to disregard
a past precedent of the Court, and the lower court therefore disregards that precedent in expectation of affirmance. An oft-cited
instance of this action is the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Hopwood
v. Texas, which essentially concluded that the Bakke decision on
affirmative action was no longer the Supreme Court’s preference.
While one can identify instances of apparent anticipatory overruling, they do not seem frequent. And anticipatory overruling
is not adherence to precedent.
ALTERNATIVE THEORY OF PRECEDENT FOLLOWING

The conventional legal theory of precedent following is one of
traditional Langdellian formalism. Judges decide cases according to the best application of precedents (and other legal sources
such as the Constitution and statutes) to the facts at hand. This
traditional theory turns judges into ciphers, acting as “law calculators” to decide cases without individuality personality or preferences. Few scholars in the law or other disciplines believe that
judges act in this manner. Indeed, few judges claim to act in this
manner. There is ample empirical evidence showing that different judges will reach different decisions in the same case and that
this difference can be explained by their apparent ideological
preferences. However, the empirical evidence falls far short of
demonstrating that individual judicial ideology explains all or
even most decisions. The following theory attempts to salvage a
kernel of the conventional formalistic theory of judicial decision
making, and combine it with judicial ideology.
I begin by suggesting that judges have a preference for following the law. In the language of an economist, judges get utility from adhering to precedent, perhaps because it is considered
part of their judicial responsibility. This is not to suggest that
judges are either saints or machines who slavishly follow their
duty at the expense of all personal predilections. Rather, I sug-

gest only that judges take law adherence seriously enough that
it forms part of their decision-making consideration. Richard
Posner has suggested an interesting analogy of judging to playing a game. Legal decision making is a rule. Just as a chess
player would get little utility from winning a match by cheating
on the rules, Posner suggests that a judge would get little utility
from reaching a desired outcome by cheating on the law. For
my purposes, it is unimportant to identify the reason that judges
prefer law or precedent adherence, simply that they do have this
preference.
At this point, it is necessary to turn to what it means to follow precedent, which requires a digression into linguistic theory.
Those who believe that the law is all political, such as critical
legal theorists, argue simply that language is too ambiguous to
constrain judges. In the hands of a skilled interpreter, words
can be colorably twisted to mean anything. The “Crits” argued
that language was radically indeterminate, so that any word
could be manipulated to mean anything. This theory of radical
indeterminacy has been generally rejected as implausible, but
that does not deny the presence of some indeterminacy in language.
Philosophers have devoted much time to exploring the study
of language, commonly called hermeneutics. Gadamer is perhaps the leading philosopher in the field and he emphasized the
inevitable indeterminacy of language. He stressed that the interpretation of a given text is influenced by the interpreter and his
or her own history and context. However, he also noted that
there were interpretive communities of individuals with roughly
similar histories and contexts who would interpret the same language with great commonality. This latter position suggests that
the judiciary might be expected to reach similar interpretations
of the same precedent.
There remains the problem of some linguistic indeterminacy,
however. A common American interpretive community would
not look at the color red and declare it to be blue. Words about
colors are not so radically indeterminate. However, consider
when that community is presented with a color such as aquamarine or some other intermediate shade. Some interpreters
might call this color blue, while others would disagree. The
word for the color blue thus has some determinacy and rules out
various shades but is not perfectly determinate, defining all the
same shades into the set for every individual. Language has an
unavoidable fuzziness.
Precedents share this fuzziness of meaning. The words of the
precedent have their own uncertain meaning, especially when
composed of very broad terms such as “due process.” Moreover,
the precedential case was resolved in a particular dispute with
particular underlying facts. While it may discuss the importance of various facts to its ruling, the precedent cannot possibly discuss the relevance of every conceivable fact that might
subsequently arise. In a later case, with different facts, a judge
might reasonably find that the earlier precedent should be distinguished, given the factual differences.
To better understand this fuzziness, one can turn to the science of categorical perception. Much of this science has examined the perception of sounds. For example, the sounds for the
letters “b” and “p” are distinct but have an intermediary continuum. A sound can depart from the “ideal b” sound and still be
perceived as a “b.” At some point, though, the departure

becomes too great, and the sound is no longer perceived as a “b”
but perhaps instead as a “p.” This produces an association that
studies of categorical speech perception have characterized as
“S-shaped.” This association is depicted below in Figure 1. The
analogy to precedent is straightforward. The precedent sets an
ideal point for future decisions, but a court may depart somewhat from that ideal point and still be perceived as consistent
with precedent. However, once the departure from the ideal
point becomes too great, it is no longer perceived as consistent
with adherence to precedent. The implications of this association are depicted in the following three figures.
To begin my depiction of the theory of precedent-following,
the relevant considerations must be reduced to some quantitative scale, which seems somewhat artificial. However, it is not
important that the precise quantification be accurate, so long as
the relationships are roughly accurate. Figure 1 is meant to
depict the nature of language interpretation as an S-shaped
curve. Suppose the best understanding or intended meaning of
a precedent is at the far right end of the figure, at the point
labeled 20. The horizontal axis is a measure of the distance of a
decision from this point 20 and the vertical axis is a measure of
how linguistically clear it is that the decision is in fact distant
from point 20.
S-CURVE OF LANGUAGE AND PRECEDENT

In this figure, a decision at point 20 is perfectly compliant
with precedent, but its linguistic fuzziness means that a decision
at point 15 appears to be quite compliant with precedent.
However, once one gets much further removed from point 20,
the noncompliance with precedent becomes quite clear. At
points 5 or 10, it is relatively obvious to the decider that he or
she is departing from precedent. If a judge perceives that the
intended point of precedent is at 20, he or she would render an
opinion based on this perception, and this would represent a

classic legal formalism. However, given the fuzziness of language, a judge might misperceive the precise location of precedent and believe that it was set at point 15.
Next I consider the problem that arises when a judge does
not like the outcome dictated by precedent – the issue of interest to researchers of judicial decision making. If a judge ideoCourt Review 29

logically agrees with the precedent, one would expect the judge
to happily follow it, but this does not display any power of
precedent, because the judge would have reached that decision
absent precedent. For adherence to precedent to have meaning,
it must influence decisions away from those the judge would
otherwise prefer to reach.
Figure 2 displays the conflict. Again, we have a precedent set
at point 20 but now the deciding judge’s ideology lies at point
0, some distance from the precedent. I assume that the more
ideologically distant the decision is from the judge’s ideology,
the less preferred it is. This is depicted by the straight line in
Figure 2, which steadily declines as it gets further from 0. This
is superimposed on the S-shaped curve of precedent following
in Figure 1.
IDEOLOGY IN CONFLICT WITH PRECEDENT

Note that for purposes of this figure, I have assumed that ideology is more important to the judge than is legal-precedent following. The ideological line peaks at point 60, while precedent
following gets no higher than point 50. Thus, if given the
choice, the judge would prefer to decide ideologically at point 0
than legally at point 20, because 60 > 50.
However, this outcome does not follow if one assumes that a
judge gets utility from both ideology and law adherence. Thus,

at each point on our distance scale, the judge gets the vertical
ideology measure for consistency with ideology and the vertical
legal measure for consistency with the law and precedent.
Figure 3 displays the results from adding the two measures
together from Figure 2. The horizontal axis is again a measure
of distance (from precedent and preferred ideology), and the vertical axis is a measure of judicial utility from adding up the legal
and ideological measures.
CUMULATIVE IDEOLOGICAL/LEGAL UTILITY

Based on my assumptions, the lower-court judge gains the
greatest cumulative ideological/legal utility by deciding the case
at around point 15. This provides “pretty good” adherence to
precedent (at point 20), allowing some influence from the judge’s
personal ideological preferences. This pretty good adherence to
precedent occurs even though the individual judge in my hypo30 Court Review

thetical model places greater relative importance on ideology
than adherence to precedent.
In this theory, the closeness of future adherence to precedent
may depend on the specificity of that precedent. My S-shaped
curve may have different dimensions, with a larger or smaller
upper plateau, depending on the clarity of the precedential command. Some precedents, which provide more detailed specificity, may have a smaller upper plateau of linguistic indeterminacy, and they should therefore command a greater degree of
adherence from lower courts. However, the effort to produce too
much precision could result in inflexible rules that will be disregarded or too easily distinguished away in future decisions.
The judicial ideological influence need not be a conscious
one. Psychologists have consistently identified a feature of
human nature called motivated reasoning. In this process, individuals analyze available information conditioned on their
beliefs. They are more likely to believe information that would
support their desired conclusion and disbelieve information
inconsistent with that result. Although a judge may be dedicated
to producing an opinion that would convince even a dispassionate observer, the factual and legal sources of a decision are filtered through the judge’s preexisting preferences, which influence the outcome.
EMPIRICAL STUDY OF CIRCUIT-COURT DECISIONS

I believe my hypothesis, that judges gain utility from both
ideologically consistent decisions and from law adherence is a
plausible one, and it is supported by various surveys of circuitcourt judges that have been conducted over the years. Like any
hypothesis, though, it must be tested for predictive accuracy.
Such empirical testing of judicial decision making is imprecise.
In contrast to traditional economics, with readily available quantitative measures for GDP and other variables, there are no obvious quantifications for ideology or adherence to precedent.
Most empirical research on judicial decision making has been
conducted by political scientists and focused on the role of ideology in decisions, so I use their basic frame and available data.
As noted above, the Supreme Court has been extensively studied
and justices have been given quantifiable scores for ideology, and
research has shown that their decisions conform reasonably well

to those ideological scores. Thus, we have reasonably reliable
measures of Court ideological preferences. To provide ideological measures for circuit court judges, I assume that their preferences conform to those of their appointing President (as measured by their ADA ratings). These provide us with measures of
ideological preference for the judges.
Providing ideological measures for decisions is even more difficult. There are no grounds for saying that a particular opinion
is located at a particular ideological point on our scale (0-20 in
the figures). Researchers typically classify these decisions on a
binary scale, as either liberal or conservative and have developed
rules for this classification. For example, if a decision strikes
down an anti-abortion law as unconstitutional, it would be
coded as liberal while if it upholds that law it would be coded as
conservative. Obviously, the available measures for judicial ideology and decision ideology are only very rough ones. This
imprecise specification, though, generally has the statistical
effect of obscuring a true association. If an association appears,
despite the limitations of the measures, that provides especially
strong evidence of its reliability.
To conduct the study, I use the already accepted measures of
ideology for the Supreme Court and for circuit court judges. I
study decisions using a vast database of thousands of federal circuit court decisions over the years, compiled thanks to a
National Science Foundation grant. This database codes the
decisions on numerous dimensions, including whether they
reach a liberal or conservative outcome.
My study considers the likelihood that a given judge will issue
a liberal (or conservative) decision. I have three essential variables to test. The first variable is judicial ideology, measured by
the presidential appointment ADA rating discussed above. If
this variable is statistically significant, it would show that judicial ideology matters. The second variable is the contemporaneous ideological position of the median Supreme Court justice.
This is the “swing voter” on the Court, whose preferences are
likely to dictate the outcome of close cases. If this variable is statistically significant, it would provide some evidence of anticipatory overruling, that circuit judges are strategically adapting their
decision to the contemporaneous preferences of the Court.
However, the contemporaneous preferences of the Court may
also reflect the past preferences of the Courts, and hence the content of their decisions and precedents issues. If so, the association might truly reveal adherence to precedent. To control for
this effect, I add a third variable for the Supreme Court’s median
voter for the prior five years, to reflect the ideological content of
recent precedents. If this variable is significant, after controlling
for the preferences of the contemporaneous Court, it would suggest that precedent is indeed driving the outcome of circuit court
decisions.
I used a procedure known as logistic regression to test the
effect of these variables on decisions. There are 20,744 separate
votes by circuit court judges in the database, for which all the
necessary variable measurements are available. Because some of
these cases have relatively little ideological content, I also ran the
regression for two subsets of cases. One subset is criminal cases,
where a vote for the defendant is considered liberal, for which
there were 7,206 judicial votes to be studied. The second subset is civil-rights cases, where a vote for the party representing a
minority is considered liberal, for which there were 2,419 judi-

cial votes to be considered. Table 1 reports the results of the
regression for each set of cases.
All results were highly statistically significant at the .01 level,
for each group of cases. The significant finding was that Ideology
and Past Supreme Court Median were positive, but the current
Supreme Court Median was actually negative. This is strong evidence against the anticipatory overruling theory but supports the
TABLE 1:
LOGIT REGRESSION ON
OUTCOME OF CIRCUIT COURT DECISIONS
ALL CASES

CRIMINAL CASES

CIVIL-RIGHTS CASES

IDEOLOGY

.05

.05

.07

SUPREME COURT
MEDIAN

-.50

-.46

-2.0

PAST SUPREME
COURT MEDIAN

.61

.55

1.0

theses that both judicial ideology and precedent are important
determinants of the votes of circuit court judges. In a logit
regression the size of the number (the coefficient) cannot be
directly compared among variables, which also have different
scales. Thus, the statistical significance of the findings does not
demonstrate the substantive significance of the effect of each of
these variables.
The substantive significance of our variables can be measured
in a different approach. For this, I considered the effect of moving from the 25th percentile on each scale to the 75th percentile.
For example, with Ideology, I considered the effect on decisions
of moving from the 25th percentile (a relatively conservative
judge) to the 75th percentile (a relatively liberal judge). Table 2
displays the effect of this change on the overall votes in the
model.
These results mean that a shift from a relatively conservative
judge to a relatively liberal judge means that the judge’s vote will
be 6.9% more likely to be a liberal one. Both ideology and
precedent show an effect. This also enables some comparison of
TABLE 2:
SUBSTANTIVE EFFECT SIZES
25% ➔ 75%
IDEOLOGY

6.9%

SUPREME COURT MEDIAN

-5.7%

PAST SUPREME COURT MEDIAN

7.4%

effects and indicate that precedent is slightly more significant.
The effect sizes are not that great, but this is to be expected,
because the case facts are important and cannot be incorporated
in the model. In addition, the sizes may be moderated by the
inability to provide precise specifications for the variables of ideology and precedent. I suspect that this problem causes a parCourt Review 31

ticular understatement of the precedent variable (because it considers only recent Supreme Court decisions and does not consider other precedents, such as those of the circuit court itself).
Moreover, it does not consider other legal factors, such as
statutes.
CONCLUSION

my hypothesis about the S-shaped curve of adherence to precedent in judicial decision making. The law and precedent do not
rigidly bind subsequent judicial decisions, but they do tether
them. Judicial discretion, an inevitable consequence of some
linguistic indeterminacy, enables small departures from governing precedent, but dramatic disregard of precedent appears to be
rare.

Judging, like any human decision making, is a complex
process. The efforts of researchers to reduce this process to
models is necessarily simplifying and fails to capture the full
scope of the decision-making process. However, those models
can illuminate key aspects of the process. There is neither
sound theoretical reason nor empirical evidence to support contentions that judges engage in much strategic anticipatory overruling. Instead, it appears that judges generally adhere to precedent, albeit with some differences depending upon their personal ideological preferences. The results are consistent with
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A Profile of Settlement
John Barkai, Elizabeth Kent, and Pamela Martin

inety-eight percent of civil cases settle,1 right? Well,
not exactly. Although claims of settlement rates of 90%
and above are cited frequently,2 settlement rates really
are not that high. Many commentators start with an accurate
picture of low, single-digit trial rates (typically 2%-3%),3 but
then they inappropriately assume the inverse—namely, that all
the remaining cases are settled. Commentators ignore the fact
that a significant proportion of cases are terminated for reasons
other than trial or settlement, and their mistake goes undetected because most state judicial systems do not collect any
information about settlements.4
On the other hand, other people, speaking more cautiously,
say that “most cases”5 settle. Is this opinion closer to the mark
or does this opinion vastly underestimate the rate of settlement? Knowing which statement about the percentage of settlements is true and knowing the statistics supporting the most
accurate statement about settlements should be important
information for judges, lawyers, clients, and policy makers.
Unfortunately, accurate empirical data about settlement rates
does not exist.

N

Although information about settlement is mainly anecdotal,
the information about case filings is available, empirical, and
accurate. Over 100 million lawsuits were filed in state and federal courts in the United States in 2003.6 However, that figure
includes nearly 55 million traffic-court cases. Focusing only on
civil cases, there were nonetheless over 17 million civil cases
filed in state and federal courts in the United States in 2003,
with nearly 8 million7 of those cases filed in state courts of general jurisdiction.8 Generally, less than 3% of civil cases reach a
trial verdict, and less than 1% of all civil dispositions are jury
trials,9 although rates of non-jury trials can vary significantly
across states.10 Therefore, perhaps up to 97% of cases are
resolved by means other than by trial.
The pattern of dispositions and trials in Hawaii courts
seems to be very much the same as the national pattern. There
were 3,661 civil cases filed in Hawaii circuit courts in 20042005. Of the 4,127 cases terminated during that same time
period, less than 2% (only 79 cases or 1.91%) reached a trial
verdict. Jury trials were extremely rare in Hawaii during this
time period. There were only 16 completed11 civil jury trials in

Footnotes
1. See Association of Trial Lawyers of America, Discovery:
Overcoming Obstacles in Getting to the Truth, 2 ANN. 2004 ATLACLE 1425 (2004); David Rosenberg, Adding a Second Opt-out To
Rule 23(b)(3) Class Actions: Cost Without Benefit, 2003 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 19; Scot Wilson, Corporate Criticism on the Internet: The
Fine Line Between Anonymous Speech and Cybersmear, 29 PEPP. L.
REV. 533, 551 (2002); Robert E. Margulies, How to Win in
Mediation, 218-DEC N.J. LAW. 66 (2002).
2. A Westlaw search found 3 articles that state “97% of cases settle,”
2 articles that state “96% of cases settle,” 20 articles that state
“95% of cases settle,” and 53 articles that state “90% of cases settle.” One article even said “99 & 44/100 percent of cases settle.”
3. BRIAN J. OSTROM & NEAL B. KAUDER, EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE
COURTS, 1996: A NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE FROM THE COURT STATISTICS
PROJECT, at 11, National Center for State Courts (1997).
4. Recently, the National Center for State Courts suggested that settlement data be collected routinely in all state courts. The
National Center for State Courts’ new STATE COURT GUIDE TO
STATISTICAL REPORTING (2003), suggests data-collection methods
that would result in some limited settlement statistics. The purpose of the new reporting guide is to “provide trial, appellate, and
state court administrators with a more accurate picture of court
caseloads and workloads,” National Center for State Courts,
CASELOAD HIGHLIGHTS, Nov. 2003. This guide suggests that courts
use eight categories of non-trial dispositions. The categories
include five categories of non-settlement: dismissed Want of
Prosecution, Default Judgment, Summary Judgment, Other
Dismissal, Transfer to Another Court; as well as three categories
of settlement: Without Judicial Action, With Judicial Action, and
Alternative Dispute Resolution. Id. at 4. Understanding and collecting settlement data, however, will still be complex because the
GUIDE suggests counting settlements during jury trials and settlements during non-jury trials as separate categories in the Trial
Disposition section of the data under the label of “Disposed After

Start.” Id. at 5. In other words, apparently such settlements made
during the course of trial will be counted as “trials.”
5. A Westlaw search found 505 cites stating that “most cases settle.”
6. The civil and criminal caseloads for state courts vastly exceed the
caseloads for federal courts. Statistics for 2003 are the most recent
statistics available. Over 100 million cases were filed in state courts
and over 2 million cases were filed in the federal courts. The state
court statistics are from RICHARD Y. SCHAUFFLER, ROBERT C.
LAFOUNTAIN, NEAL B. KAUDER & SHAUNA M. STRICKLAND, EXAMINING
THE WORK OF STATE COURTS, 2004: A NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE FROM
THE COURT STATISTICS PROJECT, National Center for State Courts
(2005) [hereinafter EXAMINING THE WORK 2004]. There were
approximately 17.1 million civil cases, 20.6 million criminal cases,
5.6 million domestic cases, 2.1 million juvenile cases, and 54.7
million traffic cases filed in the 15,588 state trial courts during
2003. Id. The federal court data is available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/ judbus2005/front/judicialbusiness.pdf
(last visited June 3, 2006). There were over 250,000 civil cases,
69,000 criminal cases, 1,780,000 bankruptcy actions, and 940,000
judicial duties before magistrates filed in the federal courts in the
2004 fiscal year. Id.
7. Id.
8. A general jurisdiction court is the highest trial court in the state and
the court where the most serious criminal cases and high-stakes
civil cases are handled. National Center for State Courts, CASELOAD
HIGHLIGHTS: EXAMINING THE WORK OF THE STATE COURTS, Aug. 1995.
In Hawaii, the circuit courts are courts of general jurisdiction.
9. EXAMINING THE WORK 2004, supra note 6.
10. EXAMINING THE WORK 2004 reports that 7% of cases were disposed
of by non-jury trials in 21 United and General Jurisdiction Trial
Courts, including Hawaii. Supra note 6, at 22. However, non-jury
trial rates vary significantly, from Tennessee with a 17% non-jury
trial rate (7 states have non-jury trial rates of 10% or above), to
Florida with a 0.5% non-jury trial rate. Hawaii was one of 7 states
with a 1% non-jury trial rate. Id.
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Hawaii Circuit Courts in 2004-2005, which is a jury trial rate
of less than 0.4%.12
Despite many generalizations about the prevalence of settlement and the growing focus on and use of alternative dispute resolution, empirical research on settlement continues to
be very limited.13 Therefore, the Center for Alternative Dispute
Resolution, a program within the State of Hawaii Judiciary, and
the University of Hawaii Law School collaborated to study settlements in civil cases in Hawaii Circuit Courts. We hoped to
learn as much as we could about civil litigation in general, civil
settlements in particular, and other information that might be
helpful in facilitating settlements and making civil case processing more effective.
What happens in the vast majority of civil lawsuits that are
not resolved by trial was the subject of our study. The study
posed some basic questions about settlement: How many cases
settle? What kinds of cases settle? When do cases settle?
Why do cases settle? We also wanted to learn more about the
length of time cases remained open as well as the type and
amount of pretrial discovery. Because excessive cost and delay
have long been considered the two primary evils of the civil
justice system, any information we could learn about these
topics would be helpful. Finally, we also wanted to compile
some baseline statistics about litigation in Hawaii that might
be helpful in the future for policy makers, both locally and
nationally.
METHODOLOGY

Two different data sets were collected to answer our
research questions. The first data set was a printout of computerized court docket sheets (“the docket sheet data”) of over
3,000 cases terminated during a six-month period in 1996, and
the second data set was over 400 surveys of lawyers who represented parties in some of those terminated cases (“the lawyer
surveys”).14 We also used the Hawaii Judiciary’s own statistical reports in our research.15
Although a full report of the study is available from the
authors and will soon be published in the Hawaii Bar Journal,
here is a summary of major findings:
The Docket
The Circuit Court civil docket was composed of 36% tort,
31% foreclosure, 16% contract, and 16% “other” cases.

11. Some additional jury trials are started but not completed. For
example, in 2003-2004 there were 8 civil jury trials started but not
completed. We assume that most of these cases ended in settlements, but we did not research that question.
12. 2005 ANNUAL REPORT, STATISTICAL SUPPLEMENT, THE JUDICIARY, STATE
OF HAWAII, Table 7 at http://www.courts.state.hi.us/attachment/
4D44FE74F4DF1267F34A9452DD/2005arstatsupp.pdf (last visited June 3, 2006). A number of trials are started but never completed. We believe that most of those are settled during trial. The
court statistics report both completed and non-completed trials.
When we refer to trials, we mean completed trials.
13. Two studies that have researched settlement are Herbert M.
Kritzer, Adjudication to Settlement: Shading in the Gray, 70

Types of Cases
Tort cases were most likely to settle by a “stipulation for dismissal,” had the longest time to disposition, and had the greatest incidence of discovery.
Foreclosure cases were most often terminated by court
adjudication with “dismissal by motion” having the shortest
median disposition time (160 days), and recorded almost no
discovery.
Contract and “other” cases showed more variation in disposition methods, had disposition times much closer to tort cases
than to foreclosure cases, and had some discovery.
Filings
Civil filings have decreased substantially over the past few
years. In 1982-1983 there were 8,921 civil cases filed; in 20042005 there were 3,661 civil cases filed.
Trials
Only 2% of cases ended in a trial verdict during the Hawaii
study period. The trial rate is now less than 2%. Jury trials were
just slightly more than one-third of 1% for all civil cases terminated in 2004-2005, and the jury trial rate has been less
than 1% since 1987. Nationally, there are reports of the
“Vanishing Trial Phenomenon” and research shows that over
the past 40 years not only that the trial rate has fallen, but also
that the absolute number of trials has decreased in federal
court even though filings have increased five-fold.
The trial rate in Hawaii is lower than the national average.
Settlement
The pattern of dispositions and actions taken on individual
cases varies significantly across the variety of types of civil
cases that comprise the civil docket.
Although “most cases settle,” the percentage of cases that
settle varies dramatically by the type of case. About 84% of
tort, 45% of contract, 20% of foreclosure, and 51% of “other”
cases settle. Contrary to the popular saying, nowhere near 90%
or more of cases settle (although torts come close).
While the data confirm that “most cases settle,” they also
identify a substantial group of cases that neither go to trial nor
settle. By subtracting trials and settlement from total terminations, we conclude that 14% of tort, 53% of contract, 78% of
foreclosure, and 47% of “other” cases terminate under conditions other than settlement or trial.

JUDICATURE 161, 163 (1986) and Milton Heumann & Jonathan M.
Hyman, Negotiation Methods and Litigation Settlement Methods in
New Jersey: “You Can’t Always Get What You Want,” 12 OHIO ST. J.
ON DISP. RESOL. 253 (1997).
14. For a complete copy of the study, please e-mail Professor Barkai at
barkai@hawaii.edu.
15. The most current report is available online at http://www.courts.
state.hi.us/attachment/4D44FE74F4DF1267F34A9452DD/2005ar
statsupp.pdf (last visited June 3, 2006).
The term “judicial assistance” was not defined in the survey and
therefore the interpretation of judicial assistance by lawyers may
vary across responses (for example, assistance by the judicial system as opposed to assistance by the judge).
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Stipulation for Dismissal was the most common method of
termination (44% of the cases), a method of termination the
authors believe indicates a settlement. Termination by Motion
was the most common non-settlement method of termination
(17% of the cases).

shorter times to disposition of a case only when cases were
open more than one year.
When judicial assistance occurred, it was ranked highly and
frequently as the event having the greatest impact on settlement.

Satisfaction with Settlements
The vast majority of lawyers were satisfied with both their
settlement terms (92%) and the settlement process (91%).

Disposition Time
The average disposition time from filing until final disposition in the circuit court was 433 days (the median was 308—
but that included 36% foreclosure cases).
Tort cases had an average disposition time of 540 days (the
median was 445 days).
Contract cases had an average disposition time of 504 days
(the median was 360 days).
Tort cases that had a CAAP award and then later settled after
the case returned to the trial track had a median disposition
time of 707 days, compared to 405 days for cases where the
award was accepted and 445 days for all cases. In the cases
where the CAAP awards were not accepted, ADR might have
contributed to the delay in disposition (contrary to ADR's generally positive benefits).
The vast majority of cases (80%) do not “settle on the courthouse steps;” they terminate more than 30 days before trial.

Types of Negotiation
Five types of negotiations were identified: face-to-face negotiation between attorneys, face-to-face negotiation with attorneys and parties, telephone negotiation between attorneys, letter/fax negotiation between attorneys, and communication
with insurance agents.
79% of the cases used 2 or more types of negotiations.
Telephone negotiations were the single most common type
of negotiation, occurring in 80% of the cases surveyed.
Telephone, letter/fax, and face-to-face negotiations took
place in almost 50% or more of the cases: telephone (80%), letter/fax (57%), and face-to-face (49%).
The lawyers rated telephone negotiations as the event with
the most impact on settlement. Therefore, telephone negotiations not only occurred most frequently, but also were viewed
as the most effective event in the settlement of cases.
ADR
42% of the cases used some form of ADR process (defined as
settlement conference, court-annexed arbitration program
(CAAP), binding arbitration, and mediation).
Three ADR events—binding arbitration, court-annexed
arbitration, and settlement conferences—had the greatest
impact in the cases where they occurred.
Events Impacting Settlement
Certain events occurred in many cases contributing greatly
to settlement in various types of cases. For example, CAAP was
used almost exclusively in tort cases and was the event having
the second largest contribution to settlement after telephone
negotiations. Communication with insurance agents was a
major factor in the settlement of tort cases, but not in contract
cases. Motions for summary judgment had a greater impact on
the settlement of contract cases than on tort cases.
Based upon the data collected, one could not predict
whether a case will settle or not based upon the events that
took place in the case. In other words, settlements and non-settlements looked alike.
Judicial Assistance
Less than one-quarter of the cases are settled with judicial
assistance.
Three-quarters of lawyers indicated that they did not need
more judicial assistance in settlement.
Lawyers believed that having more efficient and earlier
judicial involvement would have made their case settle earlier.
All types of cases had shorter median times to disposition
when settlements were reached with judicial assistance.
Judicial assistance with settlement negotiations resulted in
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Pretrial Discovery
Two-thirds of all civil cases had no recorded discovery
requests, and 65% of tort cases did have recorded discovery
requests.
Not surprisingly, there was more discovery in cases that
ended in trials than in other cases.
Lawyers estimated that if their case had gone to trial, they
would have needed to take 2 to 3 times the number of depositions they took in cases that settled.
Demographics
The average lawyer on the surveyed cases had been practicing law for 15 years.
75% of the lawyers had served as a CAAP arbitrator.
35% of the lawyers had not taken a negotiation or ADR class.
Readers of this publication might be particularly interested
in more detailed information from our survey about judicial
settlement conferences and forms of settlement.
SETTLEMENT CONFERENCES

Because judicial settlement conferences are thought to be
very helpful in aiding settlement, we designed a survey to learn
about the use and effectiveness of settlement conferences.
Lawyers were asked if the negotiated settlement was reached
with or without judicial assistance. As Table 1 indicates,
slightly less than one-quarter (23%) of respondents indicated
that their case was settled with some judicial assistance, and
three-quarters (75%) of respondents who settled reached a
negotiated settlement without judicial assistance. Our data did
not show how many cases had judicial assistance but did not
settle. More contract cases (32%) settled with judicial assistance than non-motor-vehicle torts cases (24%) or motor-vehicle torts cases (18%).
We hypothesized that appearing before a judge would assist

with the settlement process. Therefore, the survey inquired
about the total number of appearances before a judge, including motions, pretrial conferences, and settlement conferences.
Predictably, cases that settled with judicial assistance had more
TABLE 1
SETTLED WITH OR WITHOUT JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE
SETTLED

ALL CASES
(N=341)

CONTRACT
(N=99)

NON-MOTOR
MOTOR
VEHICLE TORTS VEHICLE TORTS
(N=81)
(N=161)

WITH JUDICIAL
ASSISTANCE

23%

32%

24%

18%

WITHOUT JUDICIAL
ASSISTANCE

75%

67%

74%

80%

NO INDICATION

2%

1%

2%

2%

appearances before a judge than those cases that settled without judicial assistance.
Settlements that lawyers did not attribute to judicial assistance did not report as many appearances in court. As seen in
Table 2, cases that settled with judicial assistance averaged 3.5
appearances for contract cases, slightly over two appearances
(2.2) for motor-vehicle torts, and just over four appearances
(4.1) for non-motor-vehicle torts. Those cases that settled
without judicial assistance averaged just over one (1.1) appearance for contract cases, not even one appearance (0.4) for
motor-vehicle torts, and not even one appearance (0.6) for
non-motor-vehicle torts. Table 2 also indicates that cases that
settled with judicial assistance had more than three times as
many appearances before a judge than did those cases that settled without judicial assistance.
TABLE 2
AVERAGE NUMBER OF APPEARANCES IN FRONT
OF A JUDGE BY RESPONDENTS REPORTING
NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENTS
CONTRACT

MOTOR
VEHICLE TORTS

NON-MOTOR
VEHICLE TORTS

WITH JUDICIAL
ASSISTANCE (N=80)

3.5

2.2

4.1

WITHOUT JUDICIAL
ASSISTANCE (N=225)

1.1

0.4

0.6

The lack of appearances before a judge did not appear to
bother lawyers. When lawyers were asked about their preferences for judicial involvement, more than three-fourths (77%)
of responses indicated that the settlement process was appropriate and that no change was preferred. Additionally, in
response to an open-ended question asking what could have
been done to settle the case earlier, 59% of lawyers offered no
response.
On the other hand, of those lawyers who provided a
response to the question, “Is there anything that would have
made this case settle earlier?” the most common suggestions
were focused on having more efficient and earlier judicial
involvement. It is almost as if the lawyers wanted it both ways.

They indicated that they did not need any change in judicial
involvement, yet many lawyers would have preferred earlier
and more efficient judicial involvement.
FACTORS IN SETTLEMENT

Because we sought to learn as much as possible about the
factors affecting settlement, the longest question in the survey
asked the lawyers to report on and rank the impact of methods
of negotiation, meetings with and hearings before judges, and
the use of ADR processes. This question provided a wealth of
information to analyze. We provided a list of eleven specific
events and offered one additional choice listed as “other.” The
lawyers were asked to check all of the listed events that
occurred and then to indicate which of the various events had
the most impact on settlement by indicating the top three
events as 1, 2, and 3.
The 11 events we examined can be arranged into three
major groupings:
1) methods of negotiation (face-to-face negotiation
between attorneys, face-to-face negotiation with attorneys and parties, telephone negotiation between attorneys, letter/fax negotiation between attorneys, and
communication with insurance agents),
2) meetings with and hearings before judges (motion for
summary judgment, pretrial conference, and judicial
settlement conference), and
3) various ADR processes (judicial settlement conference,16 court-annexed arbitration (CAAP) decision,
binding arbitration, and mediation).
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We analyzed the data in many different ways. Table 3 shows
some of the most important data. It should be no surprise that
the most frequently occurring events affecting settlement were
various types of negotiation (face-to-face negotiation between
attorneys, face-to-face negotiation with attorneys and parties,
telephone negotiation between attorneys, letter/fax negotiation
between attorneys, and communication with insurance agents).
As Table 3 indicates, four types of negotiation were the most
frequently occurring events. Telephone negotiations between
the lawyers representing the opposing parties occurred in 80%
of the cases, and were thus by far the most frequently occurring
of all the events. Letter or fax negotiations took place in 57% of
the cases, and face-to-face negotiations between lawyers took
place in 49% of the cases. Each of these “big three” types of
negotiation took place in almost 50% or more of the cases. The
second tier of settlement affecting events took place in about
25% of the cases (communication with insurance agents 27%,
court-annexed arbitration 24%, and judicial settlement conferences 22%). This second tier included two ADR events (CAAP
and settlement conferences). The remaining five events took
place in anywhere from 17% to just 1% of all cases. At the bottom of this third tier were the two traditional ADR processes,
mediation and binding arbitration.

16. Although judicial settlement conferences only appeared one time
in the survey, judicial settlement conferences can fit in two categories: meetings with judges and ADR processes.
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TABLE 3
EVENTS THAT OCCURRED, EVENTS THAT WERE RANKED 1-3, AND EVENTS THAT RANKED #1

TELEPHONE NEGOTIATION
BETWEEN LAWYERS
LETTER/FAX NEGOTIATION
BETWEEN LAWYERS
FACE-TO-FACE NEGOTIATION
WITH LAWYERS
COMMUNICATION WITH
INSURANCE AGENTS
COURT-ANNEXED
ARBITRATION (CAAP)
JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT
CONFERENCE
FACE-TO-FACE NEGOTIATION
WITH LAWYERS AND PARTIES
MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGEMENT
PRETRIAL CONFERENCE
MEDIATION
BINDING ARBITRATION

OCCURRED
N=380

%
OCCURRED

RANKED 1-3
N=230

%
RANK 1-3

RANKED #1
N=230

%
RANK #1

215

57%

118

51%

16

7%

187

49%

93

40%

32%

14%

101

27%

55

24%

28

12%

92

24%

49

21%

34

15%

84

22%

45

20%

27

12%

65

17%

38

17%

19

8%

53

14%

22

10%

12

5%

4%

6

3%

4

2%

304

80%

37

10%

2

1%

15

Table 3 also shows that when the lawyers ranked the three
events having the greatest impact on settlement in their cases,
the order of the events were exactly the same as the order of the
events when the lawyers just indicated the occurrence of the
events. Telephone negotiations remained the top-ranked event,
and the ADR processes of mediation and binding arbitration
were again at the bottom of the list. Naturally, the percentages
for being ranked 1-3 were slightly lower than the percentages
when we just analyzed occurrences because some of the events
were not ranked as one of the top three events in some cases.
Table 3 shows that a slightly different pattern emerged when
we analyzed which events were ranked as the number one
event in the settlement of the cases, a measurement which we
called “impact.” Telephone negotiations between lawyers
remains the event with the greatest impact on settlement. With
32% of the cases indicating telephone negotiations was the
event with the greatest impact, it has 2 to nearly 3 times more
impact than its closest competitors (court-annexed arbitration
15%, face-to-face negotiations between lawyers 14%, settlement conferences 12%, and communication with insurance
agents 12%). Court-annexed arbitration, the event with the
second highest impact (15%), really has an even greater impact
because this non-binding form of arbitration is only available
in tort cases. CAAP would be ranked number one in 20% of the
172 tort cases we surveyed if we excluded the contract cases.
The greatest change between the rankings as we move the
analysis from occurrences, to ranking events 1-3, to number
one rankings, is that letter/fax negotiation goes from the event
occurring second most frequently (57%) and being ranked 1-3
second most frequently (51%), to being the number one event
in settlement only 7% of the time. Mediation, arbitration, and
pretrial conferences are at the very bottom of the list of events,
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175

15
2

76%

7%
1%

74

2
2

32%

1%
1%

ranked number 1 at only 1-2%.
Yet another way to look at the events is not to just see what
events are ranked as number one, but to analyze how often an
event is ranked number one compared to the number of times
that event was ranked at all. We called this the “Impact
Percentage.” Using this approach, the ADR events dramatically
rise to the top. Arbitration has a 100% Impact Percentage
(admittedly it is a very small sample size of only 2), and courtannexed arbitration, mediation, and settlement conferences all
have an Impact Percentages of 60% or over (they were ranked
number one in 60 or more percent of the cases in which they
were ranked).
The data also show that different events had widely varying
impacts with different types of cases. For example, courtannexed arbitration was the number one event contributing to
settlement in 18% of all tort cases but in only 1% of contract
cases. Communication with insurance agents was the number
one event contributing to settlement in 14% of all tort cases
but in only 3% of contract cases. Motions for summary judgment were the number one event contributing to settlement in
14% of contract cases but in only 2% of all tort cases. The other
events were roughly comparable across both contract and all
tort cases, and the events were ranked quite similarly across
motor-vehicle and non-motor-vehicle cases.
This study was designed to learn more about settlements in
general and the civil docket in particular. It confirmed many
common beliefs about civil litigation and settlement, and it
also revealed many surprises. Because settlement is such an
extensive part of civil litigation, and because of the increasing
use of ADR, settlement needs greater study and quantitative
analysis. Even in the twenty-first century, the study of settlements is in its infancy.
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E-Courts:
The Times They Are A-Changin’
James E. McMillan

T

he title obviously comes from Bob Dylan’s classic song from
1964. That song captured the spirit of the times and again,
in a small way, captures ours as well. This year’s upcoming
E-Courts Conference (www.e-courts.org) in December will highlight both the changes that computers have brought to court
operations and where things are going in the future.
Court operations have been impacted over the past decade
with the implementation of electronic court document filing (aka
E-filing). This year the U.S. federal courts will have electronic filing available in nearly all district and bankruptcy courts. We
have seen that not as many court staff are needed to perform filing and case-processing procedures, and the staff working with
the information have greater capabilities since they are working
with the information rather than shuffling paper.
Security of court information has also been impacted by E-filing since it can be accessed literally worldwide as well as copied
to multiple distant computer servers so that if a courthouse is
physically destroyed, the information is safe. The 9-11 attack in
New York City proved the security of electronic court information because many law firms housed in the World Trade Center
asked the federal bankruptcy and district courts in New York
City to use their electronic archives to help to rebuild their files.
The federal courts store their E-filing information in multiple
computer servers throughout the country, making it virtually
impossible to destroy.
But the E-Courts Conference and concept is about much more
than current technology. It is about taking advantage of the
“digital opportunity” that continually presents itself. I believe
that there is a radical change about to occur in how court
automation systems will work, and how these systems will connect with one another. Technology advances have provided a
new foundation that is significantly different than what we had
to work with in the past. This article will list a few of these technology advances and why they will affect the way that court and
legal automation systems will be built.
NEW DATABASES AND SMART DOCUMENTS

What could be more boring than a discussion of computer
database technology? Apologies, but first, what is a computer
database you might ask? It is simply the software that stores and
controls data. Yet, there is big news here for legal processes now
that databases can contain and search both data stored in fields
and documents. You know what field data are from the process
of selecting a date when making an airline or hotel reservation via
the Internet. The field data pops up to display a list of possible

Footnotes
1. The complete paper can be downloaded from: http://www.ncsconline.org/d_tech/courttechbulletin/Uploads/drm-whitepaperv3.5.pdf

dates for that month. But document data are different.
Traditionally one had to apply Google-like text searches to find
data in documents. Lawyers who live with Lexis and Westlaw
know how this works. But the advent of XML (eXtensible
Markup Language), including the “Office Open XML” document
format being standardized for word-processing documents with
the support of Microsoft, will make it possible to create document templates that “mark” or identify data within the pleading,
form, or notice. And so when a search is performed by the database, it can query both the data and document information.
Since we live and breathe documents in the legal system, this is
a significant sea change.
But what this change really means is that the ability to extend
data capture is no longer the sole province of the computer programmer. It will now be possible for lawyers, judges, and court
staff to extend the database by tagging information in documents.
Thus, when some legislature thinks that it is a good idea to track
some obscure piece of information, a form can be created by the
court staff to do that function without waiting months for the
database to be changed. As a result, the court case management
database can focus on helping the courts process data, and the
new smart documents can focus on helping judges and attorneys
to present and make decisions.
SECURE AND VERIFIABLE DOCUMENTS

Last year I wrote a paper titled the “Verification, Validation,
and Authentication of Electronic Documents in Courts: How
Digital Rights Management Technology Will Change the Way We
Work.”1 The paper explored the concept that Digital Rights
Management (DRM) software could be very useful to the legal
system in that it both protects and verifies digital content such as
documents. This is in diametric opposition to the popular view
that DRM technology is inherently bad.2 The current legal system is based on the anachronism of physical possession of documents and the concept of a paper “original,” verified with a signature and file stamps. When I visit the courts in Europe, I particularly enjoy viewing the file-stamp images that populate legal
documents “verifying” that this person or that department has
done something with a particular piece of paper. Today’s reality
is that any piece of paper can be copied, manipulated, reprinted,
and passed off as an original with current scanning, imaging software, and high-quality color printers. Therefore, I believe that
any document produced by the legal system must use an “out of
band” verification system, such as the ability to view a copy of
the document online or, better yet, be verified with a digital sig-

2. See Steve Gilmore’s interview in InfoWorld magazine of John Perry
Barlow on one viewpoint of this issue at: http://www.infoworld.com/
article/03/01/24/030124hnbarlow_1.html
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nature using DRM technology. The digital signature controls
whether the document is from a trusted source like the court and
whether they are allowed to view and/or print the document.
This enhances privacy of an individual’s information and makes
its controllable in the worldwide electronic world. The E-Courts
Conference will contain several sessions that will focus on this
issue.
STANDARDIZED COMMUNICATING SYSTEMS

Similar to the telephone and electrical systems of a century
ago and railroads even earlier, current court and legal computer
systems are extremely difficult to connect with one another. This
is because, despite more than 40 years of work, there have been
no standards on how to accomplish this. Hopefully, there is considerable work being led by the U.S. Department of Justice
Bureau of Justice Assistance through their Global Justice XML
Data Model (GJXDM) Projects. GJXDM, as you can see, applies
XML and what is known as web-services technology to connect
justice systems with one another. The National Center for State
Courts has been involved in the creation of the E-Filing 3.0 standard, the creation of a number of GJXDM message standards for
warrants, protection orders, and sentencing information. In
addition, a current project is to create a test registry/repository
system that in the future courts may connect to via the Internet;
it would serve as both an electronic library for standards and a
continual resource for software using the standards. A number
of sessions at the conference will describe how this technology
will be used by courts and the legal system to set standards so
that connections can be made.

THE BOTTOM LINE

Technology in the courts and the legal and justice systems is
not being designed and implemented for the sake of technology.
Rather it is being used to solve real problems of improving information for the decision makers so that services to the citizen can
be improved and justice done for all. The upcoming E-Courts
2006 conference is another in a long series of stops the community takes in our journey to the electronic court of the future.
The discussion will continue next year at CTC10
(www.ctc10.org), set for October 2-4, 2007 in Tampa, Florida.

James E. McMillan is a principal court management consultant in the Technology Services
Division of the National Center for State
Courts. He has been on the staff at the National
Center since 1990, having previously directed
information services for the Arizona Supreme
Court Administrative Office of the Courts.
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The Resource Page
Do you think elected officials should have more
control over federal judges and the decisions they
make in court cases, or don’t you think so?

In general, do you think federal court judges are
too liberal, too conservative or just about right?

Source: Survey by Opinion Research Corp. for CNN, Oct. 2006. (N=1,013; margin of error 3%.)
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WEBSITES

Justice at Stake Campaign
www.justiceatstake.org
The Justice at Stake Campaign is a
national, nonpartisan campaign to keep
courts fair and impartial. It is supported
by a number of partner groups, including
the American Judges Association, the
American Bar Association, the National
Center for State Courts, the American
Judicature Society, and about 40 other
organizations. The website is regularly
updated and currently includes commentaries and reactions to the 2006 election
results related to the judiciary. If you’re
looking for talking points for a presentation to a civic group, this would be a good
place to check.
National Ad Hoc Advisory Committee
on Judicial Campaign Conduct
www.judicialcampaignconduct.org
Established by the National Center for
State Courts, this site includes a 50-page
handbook on setting up an effective judicial campaign conduct committee. Such
committees, composed of lawyers and lay
members, educate judges and candidates
about ethical campaign conduct, encourage appropriate campaign conduct, and
publicly criticize inappropriate conduct
when it cannot otherwise be resolved.
Included on the site are references to key
court decisions on proper campaign conduct and a list of campaign conduct committees currently in existence.

CONFIDENCE IN AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS
A Great Quite a
Some
Deal
Lot
%

The military
The police
The church or organized religion
Banks
The U.S. Supreme Court
The medical system
Public schools
The presidency
Television news

ABA Standing Committee
on Judicial Independence
www.abanet.org/judind/home.html

Newspapers

The American Bar Association’s Standing
Committee on Judicial Independence
includes an online “Resource Kit” with a
variety of materials that could be used in
crafting a civic club or school presentation.

Congress

The criminal justice system
Organized labor
Big business
Health maintenance organizatoins, HMOs
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22

12

19

14
15

12

18

9

15

9

16
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41
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12
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6
2
2
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Question: I am going to read you a list of institutions in American society. Please tell me how much confidence you, yourself, have in each one: a great deal, quite a lot, some, or very little.
Source: Gallup Poll, June 2006, reported in Polling Report.com. (N=1, 002; margin of error 3%.)
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